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In response to the broad scope of the Enron-era frauds, the federal government has
adopted novel strategies to investigate and prosecute corporate crimes. This Article
examines the use of stringent cooperation requirements and deferred prosecution
agreements, pursuant to which corporate internal investigations have become exten-
sions of government enforcement efforts. At the same time, liability has shifted
markedly to the employee level: Over one thousand individuals have been indicted
and convicted since the July 2002 creation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force,
while few corporations have been charged. The convergence of corporate coopera-
tion doctrine with the focus on individual targets results in significant unfairness for
employees who are compelled to incriminate themselves in the context of internal
investigations that are directed by the government. Because of the awkward
partnering of public governmental investigations with private corporate compliance
efforts, that normative burden on employees may not be offset by enforcement ben-
efits. This Article suggests that the government's application of a civil regulatory
model to criminal cases creates distortions because individual liberty rather than a
financial sanction is at stake, because prosecutors do not engage in negotiated gov-
ernance, and because judicial oversight at the investigative stage is minimal. This
Article also addresses the constitutional implications of outsourcing corporate
criminal investigations and argues that employees interviewed by internal investiga-
tors pursuant to the terms of a pending deferred prosecution agreement should
enjoy immunity analogous to the Garrity shield that protects public employees.
Several strands of Fifth Amendment theory are consistent with the argument that
economic pressure, such as the threat of job loss, can rise to the level of constitu-
tionally significant coercion. When that pressure is brought to bear pursuant to a
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deferred prosecution agreement, it is delegated coercion, but may be attributed to
the government as state action.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to the broad scope of the Enron-era frauds, the fed-
eral government has adopted novel strategies to manage the com-
plexity of corporate criminal investigations. Chief among these
innovations are the cooperation requirements set forth in the Depart-
ment of Justice's (DOJ) Thompson Memorandum (along with its suc-
cessor, the McNulty Memorandum) and the increased use of deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs) between prosecutors and corpora-
tions. Under its current practices, the federal government has
deferred or declined to bring charges against firms themselves and has
shifted liability to the employee level, indicting and convicting over
one thousand individuals since the July 2002 creation of the Corporate
Fraud Task Force. This Article explores a gap in the constitutional
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protections afforded those individual defendants. Prosecutors' depen-
dence on compelled cooperation is expedient but has unexamined
consequences: a bypass around corporate employees' Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and the potential to degrade
self-regulation. These costs arise, in part, from the merger of public
governmental investigations and private corporate compliance efforts.
Part I details the policies and practices of the "war on corporate
crime," with a particular focus on the factors set forth in the
Thompson and McNulty Memoranda and the terms of current DPAs.
Part II discusses how the convergence of cooperation doctrine with
the shift to individual targets results in significant unfairness for the
individual employees compelled to incriminate themselves in the con-
text of internal investigations directed by the government. That nor-
mative burden may not be offset by enforcement benefits. Although
effective corporate crime prevention often requires the cooperation of
insiders, the means used to obtain that cooperation may actually
increase the difficulty of detecting fraud by discouraging oversight and
minimizing recordkeeping. Part III argues that the government's pur-
suit of DPAs and application of a civil regulatory model to criminal
enforcement creates distortions because individual liberty rather than
a financial sanction is at stake, because prosecutors do not engage in
negotiated governance, and because judicial oversight at the investiga-
tive stage is minimal.
Part IV addresses the constitutional implications of outsourcing
corporate criminal investigations. Employees interviewed by internal
investigators pursuant to the terms of a pending DPA should enjoy
immunity analogous to the Garrity shield that protects public
employees. Several strands of Fifth Amendment theory are consistent
with the argument that economic pressure, such as the threat of job
loss, can rise to the level of constitutionally significant coercion.
When a DPA is pending, that pressure, even though delegated to cor-
porations to apply, may be attributed to the government as state
action. As a practical matter, extending immunity may also enhance
compliance investigations by privileging truthful information and the
interests of good-faith employees.
I
THE NEW CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This Part outlines the development of the government's1 current
campaign against corporate crime and the structural and strategic
1 References to "the government" throughout this Article generally concern federal
prosecutors. My focus here is on Department of Justice (DOJ) policies and practices and
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innovations adopted to prosecute it. The Corporate Fraud Task Force
was created by executive order in July 2002,2 in response to political
pressure to take action against corporate scandals-such as Enron's
December 2001 bankruptcy and WorldCom's $3.8 billion accounting
restatement in June 2002 3-and to mitigate the effect of such scandals
on investor confidence in a market already stressed by the events of
September 11, 2001. The Task Force's initial stated mission was to
"strengthen the efforts of the Department of Justice and Federal,
State, and local agencies to investigate and prosecute significant finan-
cial crimes, recover the proceeds of such crimes, and ensure just and
effective punishment of those who perpetrate financial crimes."'4 The
rhetoric soon escalated, however, to a declaration of "war" on corpo-
rate crime,5 an early sign that the Task Force's adversarial orientation
would not harmonize with the cooperative nature of civil regulatory
partnerships.
A. The Culture of the War on Corporate Crime
Cycles of scandal and reform have been the norm in corporate
enforcement. The 1970s and early 1980s featured control strategies
that criminalized corporate behavior.6 The pendulum swung back in
recent federal prosecutions. Other executive branch authorities, of course, play a substan-
tial role in corporate fraud prevention. The SEC pursues about five hundred civil actions a
year, William R. McLucas et al., An Overview of SEC Enforcement, Remedial, and Settle-
ment Powers Before and After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in 35Tw ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 1111, 1113 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. B-1396, 2003), and can call in both state and federal prosecutors through its Enforce-
ment Division. Active state attorneys general (in New York, for example), and self-regula-
tory organizations like the New York Stock Exchange, also play enforcement roles. See id.
at 1113-14 (discussing federal and state authorities other than DOJ that have focused on
corporate fraud).
2 Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002).
3 See Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scan-
dals of 2002-2003: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash with Donaldson Over Turf,
the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 443 (2004) (describing magnitude of corporate scandals that were
revealed in 2002).
4 Press Release, White House, Executive Order Establishment of the Corporate Fraud
Task Force (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20
020709-2.html.
5 See, e.g., Edward Iwata, Enron Task Force Faces Big Pressure to Deliver: Some Say
Squad Is Moving Too Slowly, but Case Is Huge, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2002, at B1 (early
reference to "Bush administration's war on corporate crime").
6 See JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME 309-10
(2003) (discussing increased enforcement role of SEC in response to financial scandals of
1970s and insider trading of 1980s). There are, in fact, interesting parallels between the
current climate and the early 1980s, when a "pro-business administration was forced by
events, public opinion and political self-interest to respond to major financial scandals."
Id. at 309.
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 82:311
THE NEW CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
the late 1980s and 1990s with calls for deregulation and cuts in regula-
tory agency budgets and personnel. But the turn of the century col-
lapse of several corporate giants pulled the pendulum back in the
other direction to a new high point on the arc of enforcement.
Although surges of housecleaning are nothing new, the perceived
scope of contemporary corporate crime has inspired particularly
zealous tactics.
The ethos of the war on corporate crime arises to some degree
from the parallel war on terrorism, which involves many of the same
DOJ officials.7 Enron and the World Trade Center collapsed back-to-
back in 2001, and combating terrorism has justified an executive
branch power grab with spillover effects on federal prosecutions of
corporate crime.8 The government has adopted a strategy focused on
"punitive regulation."9 The Corporate Crime Task Force releases
annual scorecards that tally the convictions obtained, the total fines
levied, and the number and corporate rank of defendants charged,
with no mention of the longterm ethical and financial health of
American companies.10
Faced both with the evaporation of billions (and perhaps trillions)
of dollars in capital value in a few short years and with the spectacle of
hundreds of public companies restating earnings, the government's
aggressive approach is understandable. Police power often expands
7 See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal
Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 348 (2004) (noting that Bush Administration's "war
on corporate crime" is headed by DOJ officials who are simultaneously involved in "war
on terrorism").
8 See id. ("[T]he new 'wars' on terrorism and corporate corruption have
dovetailed .... The Justice Department ... has become an extension of the Defense
Department in the 'war on terrorism'...."). In December 2005, while speaking before a
group of Houston business leaders, former Enron CEO Ken Lay accused DOJ's Enron
Task Force of unleashing its own "'wave of terror' through the relentless pursuit of inno-
cent businessmen, the bullying of witnesses, and a host of other prosecutorial excesses."
Kathleen F. Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 397, 398 (2006).
9 IAN AYRES & JOHN. BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 25 (1992) (criticizing
purely "punitive regulation" as inhibiting self-regulation and advocating "synergy between
punishment and persuasion").
10 See, e.g., CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SECOND YEAR
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, at iii (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd-yr
_fraud-report.pdf (counting five hundred convictions in one year and charges filed against
nine hundred individuals, including sixty CEOs). The media have also contributed to the
"head count" model of success. For example, in the first two years of the Task Force's
operations, CNN aired a daily "Corporate Criminal Scoreboard" on Lou Dobbs Tonight.
See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast June 20, 2003) (transcript avail-
able at http://transcripts.cnn.comTRANSCRIPTS/0306/20/ldt.00.html) ("Well now our
nightly look at the corporate America criminal scoreboard, 73 executives charged with
criminal wrongdoing, 16 of them from Enron, only one executive has been sentenced to jail
in the 564 days since Enron filed for bankruptcy.").
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when the government declares war, whether it is against external ene-
mies or internal social ills. The PATRIOT Act is one contemporary
example," but prosecutors also arrogated new powers to fight organ-
ized crime in the 1960s and 1970s,12 and to wage the "war on drugs. ' 13
In the case of corporate crime, new cooperation requirements allow
prosecutors to compel individual employee statements, to constrain
defense resources, and in some cases of derivative obstruction,14 effec-
tively to create the crime.
B. Existing Compliance Obligations: Of Carrots and Sticks
The practices termed here "the new corporate criminal proce-
dure" find their fullest expression in the Thompson Memorandum, 15
which was issued in January 2003 and replaced in part by the McNulty
Memorandum 16 in December 2006. The provisions of these docu-
ments-which are formally a set of charging considerations-are poli-
cies that can best be understood against the backdrop of preexisting
compliance obligations.
Corporate policing has long been a species of voluntary self-regu-
lation, and cooperation between internal investigators and govern-
ment regulators is not a new development.' 7 For example, in the
1970s, the SEC initiated a "voluntary disclosure program" grounded
11 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C.) (expanding federal law enforcement power, including wiretap
authority).
12 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000)) (including Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations (RICO) statute).
13 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000)) (prohibiting manufac-
ture, distribution, creation, and possession of controlled substances).
14 By "derivative obstruction," I mean those cases in which false statements or obstruc-
tive conduct arise organically from the investigation itself and are made to or directed at
proxies such as internal investigators, auditors, counsel, the media, or shareholders.
15 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys,
Regarding Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business
-organizations.pdf.
16 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys,
Regarding Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/
mcnulty-memo.pdf.
17 See William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 622 (2006) (noting that internal
investigations and cooperation "have played an important role in resolving securities
enforcement and criminal inquiries" for decades).
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in "self-policing, remediation, and cooperation." 18 In the decade
leading up to the Thompson Memorandum, compliance obligations
and cooperation with federal prosecutors stemmed in large part from
the incentive structure of the Sentencing Guidelines. Chapter Eight
of the Guidelines, entitled "Sentencing of Organizations," was
promulgated in 1991.19 The Guidelines, like DOJ's current policies,
mix the prescriptive and the proscriptive, often resulting in sentences
that more closely resemble injunctions than penalties. Organizations
earn "carrots," in the form of deductions in their culpability scores
that translate into reduced fines, if they maintain "effective compli-
ance and ethics programs" to prevent and detect violations of law,
cooperate fully in ongoing investigations, self-report, and accept
responsibility. 20 An organization is deemed to have an effective com-
pliance and ethics program only if it "exercise[s] due diligence to pre-
vent and detect criminal conduct" and "otherwise promote[s] an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commit-
ment to compliance with the law."'21 Considerations for evaluating the
effectiveness of a compliance program include "the organization's his-
tory of violations and the existence and sufficiency of its efforts to
prevent, police, discover, report, and help punish wrongdoing by its
employees. '22 The Guidelines emphasize timely and thorough corpo-
rate cooperation as a precondition for a lenient sentence. 23 "To be
timely," the Guidelines provide, "cooperation must begin essentially
at the same time as the organization is officially notified of a criminal
investigation. ' 24 To be thorough, "the cooperation should include the
disclosure of all pertinent information known by the organization,"
including information "sufficient for law enforcement personnel to
18 Id. at 624 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Samuel W. Buell, The
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 487 (2006) ("Punishing
organizations by assessing their performance in light of a legal responsibility for deterring
and punishing crime is entrenched within the modern practice of entity criminal liability.").
19 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1991).
20 See id. § 8C2.5 (2004); Baker, supra note 7, at 317 (describing organizational sen-
tencing guidelines as "carrot and stick" approach that "never had much carrot to it").
21 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2004).
22 Buell, supra note 18, at 487.
23 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA:
STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 18-19 (1995) [hereinafter THE
GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION], available at http://www.ussc.gov/sympo/wcsympo.pdf
(stating that cooperation can result in leniency). The organizational sentencing guidelines
are explicit about the value of cooperation, in contrast to the individual sentencing guide-
lines, which allow for open-ended departures from the guideline range where the govern-
ment cites substantial assistance. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1
(2004) ("[A]ppropriate reduction shall be determined by the court ... .
24 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 cmt. 12 (2004).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
identify the nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s)
responsible for the criminal conduct. '25
In addition to these "carrots," the Guidelines also provide
"sticks" to punish uncooperative corporations. For fine calculation
purposes, a corporation starts with five culpability points, but aggra-
vating circumstances increase that figure by up to five points
depending on the position of the offender in the hierarchy of the
organization, by up to two points for a previous criminal, civil, or
administrative adjudication, and by up to three points for obstruction
of justice in the investigation or prosecution of the offense. 26 Further-
more, an organization of fifty or more employees that does not have
an effective compliance program within the meaning of the Guidelines
is subject to probation and to continuing court supervision until it
develops one.27
C. The Thompson Memorandum: Mostly Sticks
The Thompson Memorandum ostensibly fits within the existing
tradition of enforced self-regulation, but it shifts the carrots and sticks
of the organizational Guidelines upstream from the sentencing phase
of the adjudicative process to the preindictment stage of the investiga-
tion. The Thompson Memorandum is a charging guideline entitled
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations that was
issued by then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, acting as
head of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, on January 20, 2003.28 As a
general matter, internal DOJ guidelines afford the ninety-four indi-
25 Id.
26 Id. § 8C2.5(a)-(e) (2004).
27 Id. §§ 8D1.1(a)(3), 8D1.4(c)(1) (2004). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also predates the
Thompson Memorandum and imposes some related cooperation obligations. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC promulgated new rules
expanding attorneys' fiduciary obligations to report potential violations to public corpora-
tions. Attorneys are now required to notify the general counsel or the CEO about any
"credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances,
for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e)
(2006) (defining "evidence of a material violation"); id. § 205.3(b) (establishing notifica-
tion requirement). Sarbanes-Oxley also increases liability for conduct that undermines
government investigations, making it a crime for anyone to corruptly alter, destroy, muti-
late, or conceal a record or document with intent to impair its use in an official proceeding.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1102, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (Supp. III 2003).
28 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 15. The Thompson Memorandum has been
formally replaced by the McNulty Memorandum. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note
16.
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vidual U.S. Attorney's Offices a great deal of discretion.29 Neverthe-
less, because major corporate fraud prosecutions often cross
jurisdictional lines, have national significance, and are overseen by a
DOJ task force, these particular internal guidelines have some force.
Indeed, the Thompson Memorandum factors have become the canon-
ical text for assessing corporate cooperation, and they were repro-
duced in nearly identical form in the December 2006 McNulty
Memorandum. There are nine factors prosecutors are directed to con-
sider when they determine whether to charge a business entity with a
crime:30
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of
harm to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any,
governing the prosecution of corporations for particular catego-
ries of crime;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by
corporate management;
3. the corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior crim-
inal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents,
including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client
and work product protection; 31
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance
program; 32
6. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to
improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to
cooperate with the relevant government agencies;
7. the collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to
shareholders, pension holders, and employees not proven per-
29 Jed S. Rakoff, The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Business Fraud
Prosecutions, in CORRIGIBLE CORPORATIONS & UNRULY LAW 173, 179 (Brent Fisse &
Peter A. French eds., 1985) (noting prosecutorial discretion is governed by policies whose
enforcement "is sometimes lax and sometimes idiosyncratic"). On the use of internal
guidelines in the morally ambiguous realm of business fraud prosecutions, see generally id.
at 173-86.
30 These factors appear in the Thompson Memorandum, supra note 15, at 3 (citations
omitted). Differences between the Thompson Memorandum and the McNulty Memo-
randum are noted.
31 This last clause-"including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and
work product protection"-was not included in the McNulty Memorandum. McNulty
Memorandum, supra note 16, at 4.
32 The McNulty Memorandum amended this factor so that it applies only to "pre-
existing" compliance programs. Id.
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sonally culpable and the impact on the public arising from the
prosecution;
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation's malfeasance; and
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement
actions. 33
Under this framework, much turns on the corporation's "cooper-
ation" with the government, including its willingness to identify the
"culprits" on its payroll.34 The Thompson and McNulty Memoranda
also weigh a corporation's willingness to sanction and terminate indi-
vidual employees:
[W]hile cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a corpora-
tion's promise of support to culpable employees and agents, e.g.,
through retaining the employees without sanction for their miscon-
duct or through providing information to the employees about the
government's investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement,
may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and
value of a corporation's cooperation. 35
Although one of the factors for determining whether a corporation is
cooperative is whether it "appears to be protecting its culpable
employees and agents, ' 36 the Memoranda never define who is "cul-
pable" or what constitutes "protection." With the definition of those
terms left largely to the interpretation of prosecutors, corporations
struggle to "appear" compliant with shifting definitions.
The Thompson Memorandum superseded a very similar memo-
randum, the Holder Memorandum, which had been in force since
June 16, 1999.37 A small but significant change between the two
Memoranda affects the mandatory nature of the considerations, the
necessity of waiver, and the use of DPAs. The Holder Memorandum
did not instruct prosecutors to reason backward from every crime
committed in the corporate context to consider whether charges might
be brought against corporations. The Thompson Memorandum, how-
33 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 15, at 3.
34 Id. at 6.
35 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11; see also Thompson Memorandum,
supra note 15, at 7-8 (providing similar instructions).
36 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11; Thompson Memorandum, supra note
15, at 7.
37 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys,
Regarding Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html. The Holder Memo-
randum drew on the Sentencing Guidelines and the U.S. Attorney's Manual to set forth
standards for the prosecution of corporate entities. Id. It made few waves at the time, but
it is the immediate precursor to the Thompson Memorandum and the genesis of the cur-
rent charging policy and the government's emphasis on cooperation.
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ever, applies to all federal prosecutions of corporations.38 By
replacing loose guidelines with strict requirements, it altered the regu-
latory atmosphere:
Only if the crime in question was serious, pervasive in the organiza-
tion and senior management had at least some culpability, either
active or by virtue of willful blindness, did federal prosecutors gen-
erally consider a corporate indictment under the Holder Memo-
randum. Now, it seems that every case of corporate crime is a
candidate for Thompson Memo analysis and potentially a corporate
charge. 3
9
As a result, "prosecutors automatically invoke the Thompson Memo-
randum criteria at the outset of every investigation and immediately
start 'grading' a company on its performance in the government's
investigation." 40
Charging standards such as those set forth in the Thompson and
McNulty Memoranda operate, in principle, to constrain prosecutorial
discretion. In practice, however, prosecutors actually increase their
autonomy to regulate and sanction corporate behavior by enforcing
factors through another "semi-automatic response" 41-the deferred
prosecution agreement.
D. Deferred Prosecution Agreements
Deferred prosecution agreements are a form of probation, or
"pretrial diversion," according to which the government agrees to sus-
pend charges against a company so long as the company fulfills every
obligation set forth in a detailed "contract. ' 42 These agreements are a
compromise intended to split the difference between declination of
prosecution and a guilty plea. Their popularity with prosecutors has
increased since the public opprobrium that followed the Arthur
38 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 162 (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crmOO162.htm ("In con-
ducting an investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and negotiating plea agree-
ments, prosecutors must consider the [nine Thompson Memorandum] factors ...."
(emphasis added)). The Holder Memorandum afforded prosecutors more discretion in
deciding whether to apply the factors, whereas the Thompson Memorandum requires that
they be considered "in every matter involving business crimes." McLucas et al., supra note
17, at 632 n.43 (citing Thompson Memorandum, supra note 15, at 1).
39 Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, in 2 37TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 815, 820 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. B-1517, 2005).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 825.
42 In some cases, the government enters into "non-prosecution agreements" (NPAs),
under which it agrees not to file charges at all if certain conditions are met. See, e.g.,
Nonprosecution Agreement-Boeing Co. (June 30, 2006), available at http:Hwww.
corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/boeing2.pdf.
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Andersen case, in which the conviction of the accounting firm was
ultimately overturned, 43 but not before the stigma of indictment drove
it out of business entirely.
Entry into a DPA ordinarily will coincide with the filing of formal
criminal charges against a company, the suspension of Speedy Trial
Act considerations, 44 and the tolling of the statute of limitations.
Prosecutors agree not to pursue the charges and to dismiss them after
a period of time (generally between one and two years) if the corpora-
tion honors all of the terms of the agreement. 45 In return, corpora-
tions undertake reforms, pledge active and complete cooperation with
the ongoing investigation, and pay substantial civil penalties and
victim restitution. 46 Companies will often be required to engage the
services of a monitor or examiner during the diversion period to
review and report on compliance efforts.47 DPAs not only promise
thorough cooperation but also include a version of allocution: a reci-
tation of the alleged illegalities and acceptance of responsibility for
them.48 A corporation that has entered into an agreement with such
admissions can scarcely defend against any future indictment, so
signing a DPA means committing to ongoing cooperation. 49
43 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2000) (excluding from speedy trial requirement periods
of delay "during which prosecution is deferred" pursuant to agreement between parties);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) (authorizing court to dismiss indictment "if unnecessary delay
occurs").
45 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL §§ 712-715 (1997) [herein-
after CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-
reading-room/usam/title9/crmOO00.htm.
46 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judi-
cial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863,
1875-80 (2005) (summarizing terms of several corporate DPAs).
47 Id. at 1877-80.
48 CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 45, § 713 (stating that acceptance of
responsibility forms part of deferral process).
49 As the court noted in a recent decision concerning the withdrawal of attorneys' fees
from KPMG employees: "Anything the government regards as a failure to cooperate...
almost certainly will result in the criminal conviction that KPMG has labored so mightily to
avoid, as the admissions that KPMG now has made would foreclose a successful defense."
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Acknowledging guilt is
also complicated for corporations engaged in parallel civil proceedings, particularly
because the allocution takes place on the government's terms. In practice, corporations
may admit wrongdoing in DPAs that, in the corporation's view, never actually took place.
As a result, corporate employees under oath in subsequent civil depositions may be forced
to deny elements of the factual recitation in the DPA in order to testify truthfully, exposing
themselves to powerful cross-examination, and the corporation to potentially extensive
civil liability.
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DPAs themselves are not a new device, 50 but they were rarely
pursued in corporate criminal cases until the Thompson Memo-
randum encouraged their use as an alternative to indictment.51 In the
last four years, DOJ has entered into twice as many DPAs as it did
over the previous ten years.52 Current DPAs also have features that
did not appear in earlier iterations, such as the waiver of attorney-
client privilege, 53 the appointment of independent compliance
monitors, the demand for business reforms subject to the direction
and approval of DOJ, and the broad acknowledgment of wrong-
doing.54 Negotiation and implementation of these provisions allows
the government to exercise a measure of control over personnel and
business decisions. Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, has argued that the Thompson Memo-
randum factors are "being used by some prosecutors, not so much as
factors in making their charging decisions, but as means to force com-
panies to behave and reform themselves as the prosecutors, fashioning
themselves as the new corporate governance experts, think they
should. ' 55 DPAs increasingly include business restrictions that range
well beyond the scope of the investigation, including terminating cer-
tain practices and products and restructuring management. 56
50 The earliest corporate DPAs go back to the 1980s, but they were rare. See, e.g., In re
Prudential Secs. Inc., MDL No. 1005, 1995 WL 798907, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1995)
(early version of corporate DPA).
51 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 15, at 6.
52 Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Depart-
ment of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 1 (2006); Crime
Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME
REP., Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm. Agree-
ments recently have been entered into with Bristol-Myers Squibb, KPMG, Monsanto,
AIG, AmSouth Bancorp, AOL, Computer Associates, InVision Technologies, MCI,
Symbol Technologies, Banco Popular, Merrill Lynch, PNC Financial Services, Prudential
Securities, and Boeing, among others. Finder & McConnell, supra, at app.
53 See infra Part III.B.
54 Tables setting forth a comprehensive summary of post-Thompson Memorandum
DPAs are available in Finder & McConnell, supra note 52, at 36-52. According to their
summary, more than two-thirds of the DPAs since 2002 require a privilege waiver, and
more than half impose a compliance monitor. Id. at 17.
55 White, supra note 39, at 818. White, a forceful opponent of current corporate coop-
eration doctrine, actually conceived of the first (and much narrower) DPA for a corporate
defendant in a 1994 settlement with Prudential Securities. Id.
56 By way of example, the DPA between the government and Bristol-Myers Squibb
made appointment of a board member contingent on the approval of the U.S. Attorney.
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement-Bristol-Myers Squibb 3 (June 15, 2006) [herein-
after BMS DPA], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros
.pdf. Former Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, in his crusades against corporate crime in
New York, also famously litigated "reforms" that ranged far beyond the correction of the
abuses under investigation. In one case, he convinced a fund organization to reduce
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DPAs thus involve prosecutors in "corporate-wide behavior mod-
ification," prescribing what is good corporate governance rather than
just prohibiting wrongful conduct.57 The agreements have grown
increasingly ad hoc, and their provisions often "flunk the most ele-
mentary standards of business rationality. ' 58 Consider the following
description of an agreement between KPMG and prosecutors:
It requires KPMG to abandon numerous components of its tax
practice; it imposes minimum thresholds of likelihood of success
that must be met for KPMG to provide any client with an opinion
supporting a tax position; it creates a mechanism for centralized
review and approval of all significant tax opinions generated within
the firm; it requires KPMG to implement and maintain a new com-
pliance and ethics program; and it imposes an independent monitor
on KPMG, for a period of at least three years, who has access to all
firm records and personnel, powers to review compliance programs
and personnel decisions, and duties to report regularly to the court
and prosecutors.59
To be sure, the widespread abuse of tax shelters at KPMG called
for fundamental institutional change. 60 But through the DPA mecha-
nism, the government involved itself directly in management deci-
sions, in personnel issues, and even in determining which employees
would be indemnified for legal fees arising from the investigation. 61
Perhaps the most circular provision of the agreement allows KPMG to
continue its separate engagement to audit DOJ's own financial state-
ments because the company's agreement to the terms of the DPA ren-
dered them a "responsible contractor. '62
The government made a similar bid for a degree of management
control when it negotiated a DPA with Computer Associates, the New
York-based software giant. The company came under investigation
mutual fund fees as part of the settlement of unrelated charges. BROOKE A. MASTERS,
SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 166-68 (2006).
57 Baker, supra note 7, at 334.
58 Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at
A14 (querying whether "any firm [can] act decisively with a government mole in its
midst").
59 Buell, supra note 18, at 490 (citation omitted). For the agreement itself, see Letter
from David Kelly, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Robert S. Bennett, Counsel to
KPMG LLP (Aug. 26, 2005) [hereinafter KPMG DPA], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf. On January 3, 2007, prosecutors
dropped the pending charges against KPMG because of its compliance with the DPA.
Carrie Johnson, Charge Against KPMG Dropped; Firm Cooperated over Tax Shelters,
Prosecutors Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at D1.
60 See Kara Scannel, Ten More KPMG Executives Indicted over Shelters, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 2005, at C4 (describing breadth of tax shelter scandal at KPMG).
61 See infra Part IV.B.
62 KPMG DPA, supra note 59, 1 21.
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for its "35-day month" reporting practices that had led to $2.2 billion
in prematurely booked revenue.63 In September 2004, the company
entered into a DPA that demanded various remedial steps and a
payout of $225 million in compensation to shareholders. 64 Those
steps were in addition to broad personnel changes that Computer
Associates had already undertaken in response to the alleged miscon-
duct, including the appointment of an interim chief executive officer, a
new chief operating officer, a new chief financial officer, a new head
of worldwide sales, and a new general counsel, as well as the termina-
tion of several other officers and employees. 65 The DPA also required
Computer Associates to name a former SEC commissioner to the
board of directors, to add two new independent directors, and to reor-
ganize both the Finance Department (appointing a new controller,
chief accounting officer, and financial controller for each primary bus-
iness function) and the Internal Audit Department.66 To oversee
these changes, the government imposed a new Compliance Com-
mittee and a new Disclosure Committee and required enhanced cor-
porate governance procedures and a comprehensive ethics program.67
Moreover, the DPA precluded Computer Associates from asserting
attorney-client or work product privilege as to requests by the FBI,
the SEC, or the United States Attorney's Office.68 The waiver
applied to any documents, information, records, or testimony that the
agencies might request that were related to the underlying misconduct
or to legal advice given contemporaneously with it.69
When Bristol-Myers Squibb was investigated for conspiring to
commit securities fraud arising out of "channel-stuffing" (enticing
wholesalers to buy and hold quantities of prescription drugs), 70 the
government elicited a DPA requiring a series of corporate reforms. 71
The agreement called for the appointment of a government-approved
63 Superseding Indictment at 7-21, United States v. Kumar, Cr. No. 04-846 (E.D.N.Y.
June 28, 2005) (alleging "systemic, company-wide practice of falsely and fraudulently
recording and reporting . . . revenue"); Alex Berenson, Computer Associates Restates
Timing of $2.2 Billion in Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at C1 (reporting Computer
Associates's restatement of $2.2 billion in revenue).
64 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7-13, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc., Cr. No. 04-837 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Computer Associates DPAJ, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/compassocagreement.pdf.
65 Id. at 3.
66 Id. at 8-10.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 4-5.
69 Id.
70 BMS DPA, supra note 56, app. A, at 1 (statement of facts).
71 Id. These required reforms were in addition to a series of remedial actions that
Bristol-Myers Squibb had already undertaken, which included payment of $450 million in
fines and restitution. Id. at 2-3.
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board member,72 the adoption of specified internal controls,73 the
engagement of an independent monitor approved by DOJ,74 and the
endowment of a chair at Seton Hall University School of Law (the
prosecuting U.S. Attorney's alma mater75) dedicated to business
ethics and corporate governance. 76 The U.S. Attorney also partici-
pated in a meeting of independent members of the Bristol-Myers
Squibb board at which board members discussed ousting the CEO,
just one day before the full board voted for dismissal. 77
E. Executive Arrogance in the Enron Era
Each of these cases of corporate fraud warranted investigation
and enforcement. The financial devastation still being wrought fifteen
years after the adoption of the organizational Sentencing Guidelines
makes clear that shareholders and employees of public corporations
require strong protections. The means employed, however, extend to
new forms of supervision, ratcheted up through an accretive process
without sufficient attention to the underlying policy goals. Infamous
implosions like Enron and WorldCom inspire prosecutorial zeal that
spills over onto small corporate failures, potentially benign practices,
and cases in which the technical guilt of individual employees is open
to question.
When firms such as Reliant Energy78 and Milberg Weiss 79 refuse
to agree to the terms set forth by the government or decline to waive
72 Id. at 3.
73 See, e.g., id. at 7-8 (requiring corporate officers to meet quarterly with auditor prior
to scheduled quarterly analyst call).
74 Id. at 3.
75 U.S. Attorney's Office, Dist. of N.J., Christopher J. Christie: United States
Attorney, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/about/usa.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
76 BMS DPA, supra note 56, at 6 ("[The] position shall include conducting one or more
seminars per year on business ethics and corporate governance ... that members of BMS's
executive and management staff, along with representatives of the executive and manage-
ment staffs of other companies in the New Jersey area, may attend.").
77 Brooke A. Masters, Bristol-Myers Ousts Its Chief at Monitor's Urging; Dolan Had
Led Firm Since 2001, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2006, at D1.
78 Reliant Energy Services was indicted in April 2004 for the manipulation of
California's energy markets. The indictment alleged that Reliant drove up the price of
electricity by shutting off its power generation to create the false appearance of a shortage.
Indictment at 5-6, United States v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., No. CR 4-125 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 8, 2004). In the press release announcing the indictment, a member of the Corporate
Fraud Task Force stated that the government "expects every corporation to comply scrupu-
lously with the law, to have internal systems that effectively identify criminal conduct com-
mitted by its employees, to disclose promptly to the government any such criminal
conduct, and to cooperate fully in our investigations." Press Release, Dep't of Justice,
Reliant Energy Services, Inc. and Four of Its Officers Charged with Criminal Manipulation
of California Electricity Market (Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2004/April/04_crm_223.htm (quoting Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General
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attorney-client privileges, they become defendants. Because virtually
no company will risk indictment, prosecutors have come to expect
compliance with every government demand. When Merrill Lynch
entered into its settlement agreement with the government in
September 2003, subsequent to Arthur Andersen's indictment, a DOJ
official compared the two firms and commented: "There's a right way
and a wrong way to respond when the government comes knocking at
your door."' 80 Similarly, when KPMG representatives failed to hit the
moving target of complete cooperation in one attempt to negotiate a
DPA, the U.S. Attorney declared: "Let me put it this way. I've seen a
lot better from big companies. '81 "To ensure that a company does not
become that 'rare' case resulting in a corporate indictment with all of
its attendant negative consequences," Mary Jo White explains, "a
company must not poke the government in the eye by declining any of
its requests or suggestions .... "82
and member of Corporate Fraud Task Force) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reliant
claimed that it in fact disclosed its conduct to the government, agreed to a settlement with
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and assisted in making evidence
available to investigators. Nevertheless, Reliant and the government failed to reach a
DPA. According to the company, the shortfall in the negotiations was the company's
refusal to concede that the conduct constituted a criminal offense. See Reliant Indicted for
Manufacturing California Energy Crisis, ENV'T NEWS SERV., Apr. 9, 2004, http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/apr2004/2004-04-09-03.asp (quoting prosecutor describing company as
"uncooperative" and company spokesperson responding that company was cooperative
but would not agree that conduct was criminal).
79 Milberg Weiss was indicted for making $11 million in undisclosed payments to three
named plaintiffs in securities class actions. First Superseding Indictment at 23, United
States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, No. 5-587(A)-DPP (C.D. Cal. May 18,
2006). The firm refused to sign the DPA that the government proposed, see Julie Creswell,
U.S. Indictment for Big Law Firm in Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at Al
(describing circumstances of indictment), and posted a statement on its website calling the
demand for waiver of attorney-client privilege a "derogation of one of the bedrock princi-
ples of American law." Statement by Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP (May 18,
2006), http://www.milbergweissjustice.com/ourstatements.php.
80 John R. Emshwiller & Ann Davis, Merrill Takes Enron Responsibility, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 18, 2003, at A3 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
81 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
82 White, supra note 39, at 820-21. The Andersen case itself provides a classic example
of the game of chicken in which some prosecutors and corporations have engaged. While
criminal charges were under consideration, the accounting firm had voluntarily taken a
number of remedial steps: It reported the destruction of documents relating to Andersen's
work at Enron, terminated the partner responsible for orchestrating the destruction,
attempted to cooperate with the government's investigation, and even made voluntary
efforts to compensate some Enron creditors and plaintiffs with $750 million. Kurt
Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Accountants; Miscues, Missteps and the Fall of
Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at C1. Nevertheless, prosecutors were insistent that
Andersen had failed to acknowledge the seriousness of the charge, in part because
Andersen had been involved in earlier investigations (including as Waste Management's
auditor), and the government therefore perceived the company as on its last chance. As a
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The Thompson and McNulty Memoranda focus on cooperation
for its own sake-in the sense of obedience to the demands of regula-
tors-rather than on the development and enforcement of construc-
tive norms of corporate conduct. The government's routine threats of
indictment also ignore the "minimal sufficiency principle" of effective
regulation, which contemplates placing inducements in the foreground
and holding sanctions in reserve. 83 When the government, as in the
negotiation of the KPMG DPA, objects to individual severance pack-
ages,84 redrafts internal memoranda, 85 instigates the termination of
particular employees, 86 and pressures firms into changing the terms of
indemnification agreements, 87 the "law-abiding selves" that exist
within profit-driven business executives may no longer be motivated
to assist with compliance. 88 The unilateral nature of DPAs ignores the
possibility for persuasion rather than punishment. The government
controls the interpretation of all the terms of the agreement, including
what fulfills the requirement of cooperation and who counts as a cul-
pable employee. Corporations, as a result, hold only the low cards in
DPA negotiations, and individual employees are not even dealt in.
result of a prosecutorial posture widely regarded as "unusually aggressive," negotiations
broke down, the indictment of the firm effectively destroyed it, and the Enron victims
thereby lost an opportunity to recoup $750 million. See id. (describing investigation and
indictment of Andersen).
83 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 19 (arguing for "minimal sufficiency
principle"-one technique for producing compliance that regulated entity does not view as
solely function of extrinsic controls-because "the more sanctions can be kept in the back-
ground, the more regulation can be transacted through moral suasion, the more effective
regulation will be").
84 See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48 (noting that KPMG considered generous sever-
ance packages to be "a ticking bomb" because "the [U.S. Attorney's Office] was unhappy
that rich severance packages had been given to senior executives").
85 Id. at 346.
86 Id. at 347.
87 Id. at 352-53 (describing government pressure designed to force KPMG to "consider
departing from its long-standing policy of paying legal fees and expenses of its personnel").
88 "Corporate actors are not just value maximizers-of profits or of reputation"; they
are concerned as well "to do what is right, to be faithful to their identity as a law-abiding
citizen, and to sustain a self-concept of social responsibility." AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 9, at 22. Ayres and Braithwaite have further described the mixed motives of
corporate executives:
Some corporate actors will only comply with the law if it is economically
rational for them to do so; most corporate actors will comply with the law most
of the time simply because it is the law; all corporate actors are bundles of
contradictory commitments to values about economic rationality, law abiding-
ness, and business responsibility. Business executives have profit-maximizing
selves and law-abiding selves, at different moments, in different contexts, the
different selves prevail.
Id. at 19.
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II
THE SHIFT TO INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY
The advent of compelled "partnering" with the government to
avoid wholesale indictment of corporations coincides with a shift to
retail prosecution of individuals. Using individuals as the currency to
purchase a corporate deferral, however, runs contrary to the original
purpose of DPAs. DPAs developed as a mechanism for resolving rela-
tively minor cases without expending significant prosecutorial and
judicial resources. They imposed a sanction less formal than proba-
tion on offenders who might benefit from supervision but did not
merit prosecution. In current practice, by contrast, DPAs are used to
settle significant cases of widespread harm, without judicial oversight
of the terms of the agreements. Those terms include compelled coop-
eration and exposing individual agents to criminal liability and poten-
tially severe sanctions. Since July 2002, regulators and prosecutors
have obtained over one thousand convictions or guilty pleas89 and
levied billions of dollars in penalties in corporate fraud cases, but few
corporate entities have been charged.
A. Focus on Employee Targets
The rapid increase in the use of DPAs stems in part from the
government's prosecution of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen.
Although the revelations of abuses at Enron inspired the war on cor-
porate crime and the launch of the Corporate Crime Task Force, the
destruction by indictment of Enron's auditor cautioned against
charging business entities going forward. When the Supreme Court
ultimately overturned Andersen's conviction in Arthur Andersen LLP
v. United States,90 the opinion's subtext admonished that not quite all
is fair in the war on corporate crime. A unanimous Court held that
the government had gone too far when it persuaded the trial judge
that the law did not even require proof of Andersen's criminal
intent.91 The firm's total demise despite its legal victory is the parable
that informs many current charging decisions. 92 As Joseph Grundfest
stated when the decision was handed down:
89 See Paul Davies & Kara Scannell, Guilty Verdicts Provide 'Red Meat' to Prosecutors
Chasing Companies, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at Al.
90 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
91 Id. at 706 (holding that jury instructions "failed to convey the requisite consciousness
of wrongdoing"). For an overview of the legal issues in the Andersen case, see Buell, supra
note 18, at 479-88.
92 On the heels of the indictment, before the trial had even begun, the $9 billion com-
pany, with 28,000 employees, was "all but dead." Eichenwald, supra note 82.
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[T]o Andersen, the court's ruling doesn't matter, the original
trial at which it was convicted didn't matter and the verdict at any
coming trial won't matter.
Andersen was destroyed when it was indicted. No exoneration
at trial and no ruling by the Supreme Court will cause it to rise,
Lazarus-like, from the dead.93
Prosecutors are justifiably reluctant to cause such extensive eco-
nomic harm. 94 When DOJ announced the DPA with AOL, for
example, it stated that the agreement was designed to "achieve[ ] a
result that minimizes the collateral damage to shareholders and
employees while imposing an appropriate punishment and protecting
the rights of victims. ' 95
Following Andersen, three factors have converged to focus corpo-
rate criminal investigations on individual liability. First, the Andersen
case itself has a running in terrorem effect that shifts the focus of both
prosecutors and corporations to individual employee defendants. 96
Prosecutors frequently invoke Andersen, as DOJ officials did when
comparing Merrill Lynch's acquiescence to the terms of a Non-
Prosecution Agreement (NPA) to Arthur Andersen's earlier recalci-
trance. The Enron Task Force Director stated, for example, that
"[u]nlike Arthur Andersen before them, Merrill Lynch is to be com-
mended for their responsible handling of this matter .... They have
93 Joseph A. Grundfest, Op-Ed., Over Before It Started, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at
A23.
94 See, e.g., Eric Holder, Op-Ed., Don't Indict WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at
A14 ("[T]o ensure that even more innocent Americans are not harmed, prosecutors must
not give in to the pressures of the day and feel compelled to indict more corporations
simply because they can."); Kara Scannell, Firms Are Getting Time to Clean up Their Acts:
If Charge Could Be Deadly, Indictment Can Be Deferred as Violators Effect Change, WALL
ST. J., June 13, 2005, at C3 (noting that DPAs are "a popular choice for prosecutors seeking
to punish bad corporate citizens without harming employees and shareholders"); James
Comey, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., Statement at Justice Department News Conference
(Sept. 22, 2004) (Lexis Nexis Media Transcripts) (stating that government has "no interest
in swinging at a wrongdoer and knocking down thousands of innocent employees").
95 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, America Online Charged with Aiding and Abetting
Securities Fraud; Prosecution Deferred for Two Years: Company Agrees to Cooperate
with Investigation, Pays $210 Million; Four Individuals Agree to Plead Guilty (Dec. 15,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_790.htm (quoting
Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 3, at 475 ("Total capitulation to prosecutors by compa-
nies under threat of criminal sanction may be the only real business strategy left to save a
financial firm's future."); Daniel Fisher & Peter Lattman, Ratted Out: That Reassuring
Corporate Attorney Who Asked You a Few Questions May Turn out to Be the Long Arm of
the Law, FORBES, July 4, 2005, at 49, 49 (noting that legacy of Andersen "lives on among
fearful corporate executives and tough-talking prosecutors"); Grundfest, supra note 93
("Andersen's demise did serve as a stern reminder to corporate America that prosecutors
can bring down or cripple many of America's leading corporations simply by indicting
them on sufficiently serious charges.").
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done just what a company should do under such circumstances. '97 In
response to "the mere threat of indictment, [companies are] handing
over internal documents, waiving the privilege that normally shields
attorney-client communications and ratting out individual employees
as targets for prosecution. '98 Prosecutors, for their part, bolster their
statistics by convicting individual defendants while avoiding the collat-
eral consequences of the collapse of a big company and the potential
embarrassment of postmortem corporate vindication.
Second, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act99 heightens the vulnerability of
individual employees. Provisions of the Act expand the definition of
obstruction, 1°° enhance potential penalties for individual criminal mis-
conduct, 10 1 and require that CEOs and CFOs of public companies
personally certify financial statements filed with the SEC.102 By
strengthening the enforcement power of prosecutors and adding
charging options for obstruction, the law "increases the exposure of
corporate managers and directors to criminal sanctions."' 0 3
Finally, the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda include two
principles that have the effect of sharpening the focus on individual
liability. In both Memoranda, the seventh enumerated charging con-
sideration is the collateral consequences to innocent third parties and
the public. 104 The eighth is "the adequacy of the prosecution of indi-
97 Mary Flood, Merrill Lynch Accepts Reforms: Firm Makes Deal to Avoid Charges,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 18, 2003, at 1 (quoting Leslie Caldwell, director of Enron Task Force)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Fisher & Lattman, supra note 96, at 49.
99 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
100 The Act includes a "Corporate Fraud Accountability" section that expressly
criminalizes tampering with a record or otherwise impeding an official proceeding and
imposes penalties of up to twenty years in prison for anyone who "alters, destroys, muti-
lates or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent
to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding." Id. § 1102,
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (Supp. III 2003). The Act also imposes criminal liability on "[w]hoever
knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in
any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States." Id. § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
101 See, e.g., id. § 903, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (increasing maximum prison term for mail
and wire fraud from five to twenty years).
102 Id. § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350.
103 Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 953 (2003). For a summary of the
Sarbanes-Oxley provisions relevant to individual culpability, see Theodore V. Wells, Jr. et
al., Current Developments in the Government's Corporate Prosecution Policy, in 2 36TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1023, 1027-28 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac-
tice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1456, 2004).
104 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 4; Thompson Memorandum, supra note
15, at 3; see also Wells, supra note 103, at 1035 (explaining that Arthur Andersen's down-
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viduals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance."105 Together,
these principles encourage prosecutors to pursue individual wrong-
doing. Both Memoranda, moreover, contain a directive to proceed
against individual defendants even when corporate prosecution is
deferred or when a guilty plea is entered for the entity.106
B. Inverted Entity Liability
This new focus on individual employee liability inverts the con-
cept of respondeat superior. Under the traditional doctrine, "prin-
cipal" corporations can be convicted for virtually any crime
committed by "agent" employees, officers, or directors who are acting
within the scope of their employment and, at least in part, to benefit
the corporation.10 7 Because a corporation acts through individuals, it
can be held liable for the collective knowledge of its employees. 08
The theory has been that culpability should be concentrated at the
institutional level because of the diffusion of responsibility within
organizations.10 9 Entity liability is not uncontroversial, but it is gener-
ally understood that "[i]nstitutions influence people in ways that
sometimes make it rational to blame institutions for what people
do." 110 Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman explain, moreover, that
"corporate liability usefully enlists the firm in interdicting or deterring
fall was likely impetus for Thompson Memorandum's language suggesting consideration of
innocent third parties).
105 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 4; Thompson Memorandum, supra note
15, at 3.
106 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 2 ("Only rarely should provable individual
culpability not be pursued, even in the face of an offer of a corporate guilty plea or some
other disposition of the charges against the corporation."); Thompson Memorandum,
supra note 15, at 1 (same).
107 E.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1909)
(upholding constitutionality of imposing criminal liability on corporation based on acts of
its agents); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970-71 (D.C. Cir.
1998), (finding that corporation could be held criminally liable for employee's acts so long
as employee had acted "with an intent (however befuddled) to further the interests of his
employer"), affd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 398 (1999); White, supra note 39, at 817 ("If a
single employee, however low down in the corporate hierarchy, commits a crime in the
course of his or her employment, even in part to benefit the corporation, the corporate
employer is criminally liable for that employee's crime.").
108 See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Corpora-
tions compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and opera-
tions into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes the
corporation's knowledge ....").
109 For an analysis of the optimal distribution of liability between corporations and
employees, see generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Mis-
conduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
110 Buell, supra note 18, at 491.
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its wayward agents and assures that it fully internalizes the costs
arising from its activities."11'
It is not clear, however, that the converse is true. Do individuals
sufficiently influence companies as large as KPMG to the extent that
distributive justice is served by holding select midlevel employees
accountable for widespread practices within the institution?' 12 DPAs
often require individuals to take on institutional failings, in concen-
trated form, in order to maintain the solvency of the corporation. 1 3
The Thompson Memorandum actually directs prosecutors to look
unfavorably on "attempts to shield corporate officers and employees
from liability by a willingness of the corporation to plead guilty.1 114
The reasoning seems to be that if corporate misconduct occurs, but
the corporation is not to be indicted, some individuals must be held
responsible in its stead.11 5 Corporations, moreover, can use deferred
prosecution combined with individual culpability as a public relations
tool to distance the corporation itself from the employee offenders.
C. Individual Exposure and Unintended Consequences
The focus on individuals converges with another phenomenon: It
is increasingly the statements made during an investigation, rather
than the alleged misconduct that triggered the investigation, that form
the basis for criminal liability. To the extent that "cover-ups" displace
underlying crimes, 116 weight also shifts from the initial wrongdoing to
111 Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 689.
112 Cf Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 106 ("Rarely do the character flaws of a lone actor fully explain
corporate misconduct.").
113 See, e.g., Fisher & Lattman, supra note 96, at 49-50 (quoting former Assistant U.S.
Attorney who observed that "[t]here was a time when companies would try to step up to
the plate, even try to take a guilty plea to protect their individual employees .... [n]ow it's
just the opposite"); William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution: Cooperation and the
Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 651-57 (2002) (criticizing practice of exchanging
individual employee offenders for corporate leniency).
114 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 15, at 8; see also McNulty Memorandum, supra
note 16, at 18 ("[P]rosecutors generally should not agree to accept a corporate guilty plea
in exchange for non-prosecution or dismissal of charges against individual officers and
employees.").
115 Corporations and their individual agents do not, however, have interchangeable cul-
pability. See GOBERT & PUNCH, supra note 6, at 282 ("Companies perforce act through
individuals, but individuals also act through companies, and the criminal liability of the one
should not preclude, or require, a prosecution of the other.").
116 See Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9,
36-37 (2005) ("[C]over-up cases are typically cheaper to prosecute, more comprehensible
to the jury, and less subject to subtle nuances in proof."); William J. Stuntz, The Patholog-
ical Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MiCH. L. REV. 505, 552 (2001) (noting that crimes such as
false statements "can make criminal trials low-risk affairs for the government"). It is often
difficult to prove accounting fraud beyond a reasonable doubt "to jurors whose heads are
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the interaction between investigators and potential targets. Acts that
are by themselves innocuous take on criminal significance because of
the intense scrutiny that comes with cooperation. An employee may
have a reasonable fear of prosecution that leads to evasive behavior
later charged as obstructive, even though that employee may have
been innocent of any wrongdoing prior to questioning. 117
Deputizing corporate insiders has the intended result of pro-
ducing more individual prosecutions, but there is reason to believe
that it also has unintended consequences contrary to shareholders'
best interests. First, corporate officers and board members may
engage in additional wrongdoing to avoid detection and exposure to
individual liability. Board members, for example, necessarily concern
themselves not only with their fiduciary duties but also with their per-
sonal liability exposure. They may respond to the pressures of investi-
gations with still more creative accounting11 8 and still fewer internal
swimming with GAAP, GAAS, FASB, SOPs, and the AICPA. On the other hand, even
the layest of laypersons can get his head around a lie or a destroyed document." Richard
M. Strassberg et al., Lawyers on Trial: Government Views Attorneys as 'First Line of
Defense' Against Corporate Malfeasance, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2005, at 9, 12. Consider the
case of Bruce G.'Hill, the general counsel of a small Boston-based software company, Inso
Corp., who was convicted on only one of two perjury charges for a false exculpatory state-
ment but was found not guilty of the securities and wire fraud charges that had prompted
the investigation in the first place. Id. Similarly, in a case in which four Merrill Lynch
employees had been charged with aiding Enron's fraudulent accounting, the Fifth Circuit
tossed out all of the conspiracy and wire fraud counts and left standing only the perjury
and obstruction counts against a single Merrill Lynch defendant. United States v. Brown,
459 F.3d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 2006).
117 Members of the Supreme Court have recognized, for example, that the federal false
statement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000), has the potential to "escalate completely inno-
cent conduct into a felony." Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 411 (1998) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Brogan, 522 U.S. 398 (No. 96-
1579) (Solicitor General) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v.
Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 82 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning that majority's inter-
pretation of § 1001 would "criminalize the making of even the most casual false statements
so long as they turned out, unbeknownst to their maker, to be material to some federal
agency function"). In Brogan, Justice Ginsburg noted with approval DOJ's policy against
charging § 1001 violation in situations in which the suspect, during investigation, merely
denies guilt in response to questioning by the government. 522 U.S. at 415 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL T1 9-
42.160 (1997)).
118 Tom Kirchmaier & Mariano Selvaggi, The Dark Side of 'Good' Corporate Govern-
ance: Compliance Fuelled Book-Cooking Activities 13 (London Sch. Econ., Fin. Mkts.
Group, Discussion Paper No. 559, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=895362 (concluding that higher audit intensity can "fuel managerial book
cooking"); see also Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1331, 1369 (2006) ("Sanctioning first-order detection avoidance encourages 'second-order'
detection avoidance. Sanctioning second-order encourages third. Sanctioning third
encourages fourth. And so on.").
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controls and records. 119 Some individuals, moreover, may choose not
to serve on boards at all in order to avoid exposure to personal
liability:
Facing increased administrative responsibilities and costs as well as
decreased nimbleness in managing companies that results from this
imbalance of prosecutorial power, the most qualified candidates
now often refuse board positions-a trend that hurts our markets
by draining the most qualified human capital and thereby
decreasing the efficiency of public corporations.1 20
General counsels have not fared well themselves in the war on corpo-
rate crime, and they may also temper strong advocacy because of their
own liability exposure. 121 Thus, prosecutorial strategies meant in
theory to improve corporate governance may in fact result in less, and
less capable, oversight.
Second, given the scope of privilege waivers, deputizing corpo-
rate insiders to perform prosecutorial functions makes it difficult for
employees to consult in good faith with counsel about compliance. 122
A company's waiver of privilege extends to conversations between
employees and corporate counsel that took place before the suspected
wrongdoing even occurred. 123 As a result, employees who answer
questions of company counsel, about any matter, are effectively
building up evidence for unpredictable future criminal cases; waivers
are so broad that it is as though employees are "speaking to prosecu-
tors" every time they seek advice. 124 Over time, corporations will
respond by excluding lawyers from the very situations in which com-
petent legal advice might best be able to ensure compliance with the
119 See, e.g., Sanchirico, supra note 118, at 1360 ("Not knowing or caring to focus con-
stant attention on whether any given set of notes will end up as, or lead to, damaging
evidence, the individual too broadly refrains from recordation.").
120 McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 641.
121 See, e.g., Strassberg et al., supra note 116 ("[T]he line between appropriate advice to
limit or control the flow of information and obstruction of justice is exceedingly thin.").
Computer Associates General Counsel Steven Woghin, for example, was indicted for,
among other charges, advising some employees who later "failed to acknowledge" the
thirty-five-day month accounting practice. See Information at 4, 10-11, 13, United States
v. Woghin, No. 04 CR 847 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004).
122 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (stating that narrowing
scope of attorney-client privilege "not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to
formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal problem but also
threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compli-
ance with the law").
123 Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutors' Tough New Tactics Turn Firms
Against Employees; As Sentencing Rules Stiffen, KPMG Axes Tax Partners, Won't Pay
Their Legal Costs; What 'Cooperation' Entails, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at Al (detailing
KPMG's cooperation with prosecutors).
124 George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 985, 993 (2005).
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law.' 25 As one corporate attorney put it, "If you know the in-house
lawyer is a mini-G-man, are you inviting him to important strategic
meetings?"126
Third, corporate cooperation doctrine may cause disloyalty
within the corporation. The McNulty Memorandum states that a cor-
poration's cooperation in selecting targets of employee prosecution is
"critical" because shared lines of authority, dispersed records and per-
sonnel, and the intervening promotion, transfer, or termination of cul-
pable or knowledgeable employees all pose "obstacles" to a
prosecutor determining for herself which individual is responsible for
wrongdoing.1 27 DPAs effectively deputize corporate counsel and
auditors as government agents; corporations are expected not only to
raise the hue and cry when misconduct occurs128 but also to assist in
identifying, apprehending, and prosecuting viable employee targets.
The negotiation and implementation of DPAs thus tends to alter key
relationships-not only between counsel and corporate clients but
between management and employees as well.
Corporations have been expected not only to withdraw financial
support from embattled employees but also to reveal individual
defense strategies to prosecutors by reporting the documents that
125 See McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 630 n.36 (summarizing survey of corporate
counsel indicating that 96% found privilege facilitated their work as counsel and that 95%
agreed that weakening it would "chill[ ] a client's frank discussion of legal issues") (citing
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
SURVEY: THE ATrORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE IS UNDER ATTACK 2-3 (2005), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legislation/OvercriminalizationOO2/$FILE/AC-Survey
.pdf).
126 Fisher & Lattman, supra note 96, at 50 (quoting Susan Hackett, senior vice president
of Association of Corporate Counsel).
127 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 7. DOJ officials have also stated that
cooperation requires briefing the government on everything the corporation has learned in
its internal investigations and bringing in "all the witnesses the government will need to
figure out exactly what happened." Interview with United States Attorney James B. Comey
Regarding the Department of Justice's Policy on Requesting Corporations Under Criminal
Investigation to Waive the Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, U.S.
ATr'ys' BULL., Nov. 2003, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Comey Interview]. Cooperation, according
to now-Deputy Attorney General Comey, means "telling the Government what the corpo-
ration knows about what happened, who did it, and how they did it." Id.
128 There are some analogies between this expectation and the role of the citizenry prior
to the establishment of a robust corps of state prosecutors. See David A. Sklansky &
Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can
Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 688-89 (2006) (discussing
nineteenth-century practice of hiring private prosecutors due to insufficient state
resources); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH U. L.Q. 1, 30-31 (1993) (describing
common law duty to report felonies). Of course, in this case, the "private attorneys gen-
eral" in question are also the putative defendants.
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employees request for use in their defense. 129 Internal investigations
"often turn companies against the very executives and employees who
are paid to act in the company's best interests. ' 130 The current inves-
tigative climate thus creates "conflict between the corporation and the
individuals managing it or serving it.''131 Nor do employees always
receive fair warning of the extent to which the corporation's interests
diverge from their own. When employees are questioned, they are
generally offered the classic Upjohn warnings that advise them that
corporate counsel represents the corporation, 132 and that conversa-
tions and interviews are privileged only to the extent that the corpora-
tion chooses not to waive the privilege. 133 With the potent threat of
liquidation pending, however, corporations must actively seek cul-
pable employees; the hard truth is that nothing is internal, and the
corporation's and the employees' interests are no longer aligned.
That decline in the traditional loyalty relationships among employees,
and between the corporation and its employees, is hardly an optimal
condition for compliance or economic success. 134 As Ellen Podgor has
129 Cohen, supra note 123 (describing measures taken by KPMG to satisfy expectations
of prosecutors); see also Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The Government in
Employer-Employee Relationships, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 803 (2002) (discussing con-
flicting interests in "'information control'" and noting that "[c]ooperation by either the
employer or employee who is being investigated can disadvantage the other party in their
defense") (citing KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 6-8 (1995));
Vanessa Blum, Justice Deferred, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 1 (discussing recent DPAs
"requiring companies to assist in the prosecution of individual defendants").
130 McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 622.
131 Id. at 636; see also Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prose-
cution Agreements, supra note 52 ("Ten years ago, it was-save the individuals and plead
the corporation. Now, things have radically changed and it's totally reversed. Now, the
government has set up a system where it's-save the corporation by sacrificing the individ-
uals." (quoting corporate defense attorney Theodore Wells)).
132 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 394-95 (1981) (emphasizing, when
upholding invocation of attorney-client privilege by corporation against government effort
to obtain records of employee interviews, that corporation holds privilege and that "the
employees themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order
that the corporation could obtain legal advice"). Corporate counsel that has been com-
mandeered by the government may have an incentive to downplay Upjohn disclaimers
because an employee concerned that her interests are not being served by corporate
counsel will be less inclined to reveal damaging information and therefore less likely to
earn the corporation coveted cooperation points under the Sentencing Guidelines.
133 For an example of the minimal Upjohn and waiver warnings that employees receive
prior to internal interviews, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333, 336, 340 (4th Cir.
2005), which describes "watered-down" Upjohn warnings provided by corporate counsel to
AOL Time Warner employees.
134 See JOHN HASNAS, TRAPPED: WHEN ACTING ETHICALLY Is AGAINST THE LAW 5-6,
59-84 (2006) (arguing that enforcement practices force violations of companies' ethical
responsibilities to employees who may be innocent); John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men, A.B.A.
J., June 2003, at 46, 51 ("[Clorporate lawyers are particularly worried that Justice is trying
to drive a wedge between companies and employees.").
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argued, "[p]lacing the employer and employee in an adversarial posi-
tion, in an attempt to secure the benefits of cooperation, interferes
with the overriding fiduciary employment relationship.' '135
Firms that cite loyalty to employees and resist government
demands to produce them for prosecution may be penalized. When
Milberg Weiss was indicted, 136 for example, the firm alleged that the
government would not extend it a DPA because the firm refused to
"make unfounded statements accusing its own partners of crimes and
otherwise become an agent for the government. ' 137 Furthermore,
once employees are indicted, the government drives a wedge between
them and their corporate employer, precluding advice or assistance
from the company, and preventing confidential communication
between the two parties.138
By contrast, corporations that deliver their employees for prose-
cution are rewarded. Unlike Milberg Weiss, KPMG was able to
secure a DPA by agreeing both to withdraw legal fees from employee
defendants and to instruct employees who did retain counsel to focus
on "law firms that were familiar with these types of proceedings and
who understand that cooperation with the government was the best
way to proceed. ' ' a39 When KPMG pitched its cooperation to the gov-
ernment in negotiations for a DPA, it claimed that it told employees
they would only have attorneys' fees paid if they fully cooperated and
pointed out that the corporation "took action" whenever prosecutors
reported that an employee resisted an interview. 140 As a result,
according to KPMG's counsel, "current or former personnel who oth-
erwise would not have cooperated did cooperate, and those who did
not had their fees cut off and, in two instances, were separated from
135 Podgor, supra note 129, at 803; see also Paine, supra note 112, at 112 ("A formal
ethics program can serve as a catalyst and a support system, but organizational integrity
depends on the integration of the company's values into its driving systems.").
136 See supra note 79.
137 John R. Wilke et al., Milberg Indicted on Charges Firm Paid Kickbacks, WALL ST. J.,
May 19, 2006, at Al.
138 See, e.g., McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11 (suggesting that providing
information to employees pursuant to joint defense agreement cuts against finding corpo-
ration cooperative).
139 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citation omitted).
This might be viewed as the converse of the situation that arises when low-level drug
defendants are represented by cartel lawyers. Those lawyers often are retained to protect
the interests of the organization by preventing the defendant from providing information
to the government, even if cooperation is in the best penal interests of the defendant. In
the corporate cooperation context, employees may reveal or even create offenses by
speaking to investigators, but they are compelled to speak in order to protect the corpora-
tion's deferred prosecution agreement.
140 Id. at 348-49.
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the firm.' 14 1 KPMG even adjusted the wording of an internal memo-
randum at the government's request, informing employees that they
could meet with government investigators without the assistance of
counsel. 142 When the government is involved in the fine points of
drafting memoranda to employees, when it has pledged that it will
examine any legal assistance to employees "under a microscope,"'143
and when it uses that inroad into corporate governance to expedite
investigations, there may be little space left for integrated ethical man-
agement by the corporation itself. 144
Companies, furthermore, have little recourse if they disagree with
the government about which employees are guilty of wrongdoing. 145
There is "no realistic choice but to cooperate fully with the govern-
ment, even if evidence might later demonstrate that the government's
theories were legally infirm or that factual allegations couldn't with-
stand cross-examination.' 46 The government, after all, did not ulti-
mately sustain its case against Arthur Andersen, but the damage was
long since done and the delayed vindication of a jury verdict or appel-
late ruling is cold comfort when a company is out of business.
Because both the litigation costs and the public relations debacle of
indictment can be fatal to corporations, especially in highly regulated
industries, "they are often compelled to settle, even if it means taking
positions contrary to their officers and employees, '' 147 and even
though "the case [is] largely settled before a court has weighed the
first bit of evidence or tested a single legal theory. ' 148 This is particu-
larly problematic when the appropriate scope of an investigation,
141 Id. at 349.
142 Id. at 346-47 ("[T]he government's purpose in demanding the supplement [to
KPMG's internal advisory memorandum to employees] was to increase the chances that
KPMG employees would agree to interviews without consulting or being represented by
counsel .... ").
143 Id. at 344.
144 For a description of integrated ethical management and its potential for ensuring
long-term compliance, see generally Paine, supra note 112.
145 As former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White has asked:
If a company, after thorough investigation, does not agree with the govern-
ment on who is guilty of wrongdoing, what does the company do when the
government is rattling its sabers about insufficient remediation? Throw over-
board those the government believes have done wrong to save the company, or
fight for them and try to convince the government that it is wrong? A horrible
Hobson's choice if a prosecutor is insistent.
White, supra note 39, at 822.
146 Grundfest, supra note 93 (describing predicament facing American Insurance Group
in 2005); see also Ken Brown et al., Called to Account: Indictment of Andersen in Shred-
ding Case Puts Its Future in Question, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at Al (pointing out that
no major financial services firm has survived indictment).
147 McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 639.
148 Id. at 640.
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legitimate targets, and the guilt or innocence of corporate actors are
rarely clear-cut issues.149 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
corporate criminal behavior "is often difficult to distinguish from the
gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business
conduct." 5 0
III
THE SOLUTION Is ALSO THE PROBLEM
The foregoing discussion of how DPAs are leveraged to build
cases against employee defendants raises the question of whether cor-
porate cooperation doctrine violates individual constitutional protec-
tions, a topic discussed in detail in Part IV. Before turning to that
issue, this Part analyzes how DOJ's policies evolved as they did and
suggests that current practices illustrate the counterproductive effects
of using the blunt instrument of federal criminal law to address regula-
tory problems.
Part of the answer lies in the sheer enormity of the problem of
corporate fraud. The harm is great, the charges are complex, and gov-
ernment resources are stretched thin. Given these challenges, the
government's commandeering of internal corporate investigators at
first appears sound.151 Indeed, the organizational guidelines were
adopted in part on the theory that strong private corporate compli-
ance efforts would augment limited government resources. 152 Unrav-
149 On the fluid boundaries of white collar criminal conduct, see William J. Stuntz, Self-
Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1883 (2000), who notes that "[w]hite-collar crime is
very different from street crime .... [i]n white-collar cases it is often clear that the defen-
dant did something; what isn't clear is whether what the defendant did amounts to fraud,"
and Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 180-81
(2004), who observes that "[i]n some cases, neither prosecutors nor courts know whether
the conduct at issue is encompassed by the criminal law," as "[w]hether conduct is criminal
can depend on the actor's state of mind, the egregiousness of the conduct and resulting
harm, and is sometimes a matter of degree" (footnotes omitted).
150 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978) (discussing behavior
proscribed by Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976)).
151 As former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh reportedly stated:
You're trying to get every edge you can on those people who are devising
increasingly more intricate schemes to rip off the public, hiring the best law-
yers, providing the best defenses.
So you're constantly pushing the edge of the envelope out to see if you
can get an edge for the prosecution.
Jim McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutors' Powers: Aggressive Tactics Put Fair-
ness at Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al.
152 See Win Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines' "Carrot and Stick" Philosophy,
and Their Focus on "Effective" Compliance, in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra
note 23, at 27, 34 (stating that policy of organizational sentencing guidelines is "interactive"
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eling the threads of an intricate corporate fraud scheme without
extensive cooperation is also a daunting challenge, and a direct
approach to potential employee cooperators may be constrained by
ethical rules prohibiting contact with employee witnesses without the
consent of the company. 153 In the KPMG tax shelter case, for
example, before trial had even begun, government discovery materials
included millions of pages of documents, plus "transcripts of 335 dep-
ositions and 195 income tax returns. 1' 54 It is simply impossible for
federal agents to analyze that volume of material independently or to
complete a timely investigation without borrowing from internal com-
pliance reviews.155 That enforced sharing is fine as far as it goes; the
government needs to rely on existing internal reports, and corpora-
tions are accustomed to assisting in investigations by providing
records and information. 156 Recently, however, prosecutors have
attempted to keep pace with corporate defendants by asking for a
great deal more, seeking to increase the efficiency and affordability of
and purpose is for limited government enforcement resources and efforts to be "aug-
mented by the potentially highly effective efforts of companies themselves").
153 See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1253, 1257 (8th
Cir. 1998) (upholding district court's protective order prohibiting government attorneys
from engaging in ex parte communications with defendant's current employees).
154 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Declaration
of Michael Anderson 24, 27, 38-39, 41, Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (No. 05-CR-0888));
see also, e.g., Computer Associates DPA, supra note 64, at 4 ("CA's internal investigation
was conducted with the assistance of a forensic accounting team ... and involved more
than 100 interviews and the review of hundreds of thousands of pages of documents and e-
mails.").
155 Deputy Attorney General James Comey has acknowledged that prosecutors must
rely on the work of internal investigators:
Some internal investigations cost millions of dollars and analyze hundreds of
thousands of documents. Federal prosecutors don't have funds for that, and
would be unable to replicate that work. They can, however, work with a report
of such an internal effort in order to conduct a thorough and complete Gov-
ernment investigation.
Comey Interview, supra note 127, at 4; see also Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to
WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 373
(2003) (observing that complex corporate fraud investigations require enormous "invest-
ment of time, money, and personnel" and that investigators need knowledge of "inner
workings" of corporation and "day-to-day interactions among key players"); Pamela H.
Bucy, "Carrots and Sticks": Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 277,
313 (2004) (noting that regulators rely on insiders to provide specific information about
corporate wrongdoing and are "condemned to play catch up" without such information).
156 See A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,
TASK FORCE REPORT, MAY 2005, at 14 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf (stating that seeking corporate cooperation is legit-
imate practice to extent that it primarily involves "providing relevant documents and infor-
mation other than privileged communications and attorneys' litigation work product").
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investigations by gaining access to the entire range of work done by
corporate counsel and auditors. 157
A. Problematizing the Private Enforcement Analogy
In order to meet the challenges of corporate fraud investigations,
the government has borrowed, reflexively, from a model of civil regu-
latory partnership and grafted it onto the quite different circum-
stances of federal criminal law enforcement. 158 In the short view,
"partnering" with internal investigators as a solution to the high costs
and slow reaction times associated with corporate criminal investiga-
tions seems both efficient and desirable. Hybrid public/private
enforcement, after all, is often praised for producing superior results.
Jody Freeman has argued that there is no purely public or purely pri-
vate realm, only negotiated relationships between public and private
actors, who together can produce aggregate accountability through
horizontal negotiation.159 "Private attorneys general" have deep his-
torical roots, 160 and, "[a]lthough the government's prosecutorial
capacity has grown considerably since the nineteenth century, the gap
between rule prescription and enforcement remains large enough to
allow for a significant nongovernment role." 161
157 See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 902
(2006) (noting that DOJ policy on waiver "was intended to promote efficiency and costs
savings").
158 See, e.g., CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/CRMAnnualReport2004.pdf (touting "flexible
and innovative approaches" to enforcement that "strike the right balance between diligent
enforcement and deterrence on the one hand, and proper incentives for companies to self
report and cooperate on the other").
159 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
547-48 (2000).
160 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN His-
TORY 29 (1993) (arguing that early American law enforcement "drew no clear lines
between public and private"); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1165, 1193-1229 (1999) (describing emergence of public policing and explaining that law
enforcement has "never been an entirely public function").
161 Freeman, supra note 159, at 662. A useful illustration of a successful public/private
partnership in administrative law-including the motivation to self-regulate--comes from
California's Cooperative Compliance Program. Designated compliance officers from
CAL-OSHA act "as problem solving consultants to the process rather than as mere
enforcement agents." Id. at 652. Many commentators hold out the FDA as another
example of an agency that has developed a partnership with its regulated entities, particu-
larly drug companies. The pharmaceutical industry uses "FDA approval" as a marketing
tool, as a defense, and as evidence of due diligence:
Just as the drug companies have learned that it can be to their interest to co-
operate with the FDA, so too has the FDA learned that overly aggressive mea-
sures to secure compliance can backfire and lead to counter-measures by the
industry to evade controls and to continue legally questionable practices.
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The literature on successful regulatory partnerships between
external and internal enforcement suggests that there can and should
be joint gains from trade, that the self-interest of the corporation and
the incentive for compliance can intersect,162 and that it is possible to
"harness[] private capacity to serve public goals.' 63 Nevertheless,
the civil regulatory partnership model does not function properly, and
in fact may create distortions, when it is imported into the realm of
individual criminal prosecutions.
First, the adversarial criminal process is fundamentally different
from the administrative context, both because the stakes of individual
liberty are uniquely high, and, paradoxically, because the thorough
oversight of which parties can avail themselves in the administrative
state does not exist in criminal investigations. Rachel Barkow points
out that "[a]ll agency proceedings-formal or informal, rulemaking or
adjudication-are subject to extensive judicial review." 164 Adminis-
trative agencies, moreover, "must give reasons if they change course
from case to case, and there must be support for the agency's decision
in the administrative record. '' 165 In the context of federal criminal law
enforcement, by contrast, there is "no structural separation of adjudi-
cative and executive power, and defendants have no right to a formal
process or internal appeal within the agency. 166
Although the FDA has now established that it is prepared to take on large
companies when required, it also appreciates that there are times when a less
confrontational approach can be more effective.... [Tlhe FDA exemplifies a
'mature' regulatory agency which has arrived at what has been called a form of
'ascendancy' through the judicious combination of compliance and deterrence
strategies.
GOBERT & PUNCH, supra note 6, at 308.
162 For example, in the administrative law arena, Jody Freeman has argued:
Even if, consistent with rational actor theory, private actors are motivated only
by self-interest, they might nonetheless have something to offer the regulatory
process; conceivably, they could contribute to an effective and accountable
regulatory regime.
• ..To some extent, informal agreements, norms, market mechanisms,
third party oversight, and even formal contract, could conceivably augment
accountability. While these complementary measures may not satisfy eve-
ryone, surely they are worth exploring-and without an appreciation of public/
private interdependence they remain invisible.
Freeman, supra note 159, at 638.
163 Id. at 549.
164 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1022-23 (2006).
165 Id. at 1023.
166 Id. at 1025. Oversight is further limited because when prosecutors draw on private
resources, the natural check on overreaching provided by the "costliness of investigations,
combined with real budgetary limits" is eliminated. McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 639.
Once prosecutors have commandeered private attorneys to investigate a corporation at its
own cost, they have "no incentive to hold back on some investigations that would other-
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A second hindrance to hybrid criminal enforcement is the cul-
tural and experiential orientation of prosecutors. 167 Prosecutors, by
nature and necessity, are adversarial; they do not have the administra-
tive expertise to pursue regulatory goals or fashion settlements that
enable economic growth while meeting those goals. But comman-
deering the private sector is a quick fix for the challenges of prose-
cuting the complex and numerous manifestations of corporate
criminality. The tactic is also "successful" in that it increases the
indictment statistics-fines imposed and convictions obtained-that
the government currently uses to measure its progress in the "war on
corporate crime. ' 168 Defendant corporations, in their own way, seek
immediate gratification as well, keeping one eye on the quarterly
report 169 and another on the public relations implications of investiga-
tion and indictment.1 70
The government's strategy of immediately threatening an indict-
ment also lacks the flexibility necessary for an effective regulatory
partnership. Successful models for combining internal corporate com-
pliance and external government regulation tend to avoid such
rigidity.' 7' Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, for example, have pro-
posed "tit-for-tat (TV-T) enforcement," according to which "the regu-
lator refrains from a deterrent response as long as the firm is
wise be unproductive, and the government has nearly unlimited opportunity-with a very
low threshold for cost-effectiveness-to find misconduct." Id.
167 See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruc-
tion Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 674 (recognizing "adver-
sarial orientation, selection, and training" of prosecutors).
168 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. On the difficulty of measuring the
deterrence impact of white collar crime prosecutions, see Daniel C. Richman & William J.
Stuntz, A/ Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecu-
tion, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 615 (2005), which notes that DOJ's annual Performance and
Accountability Report "doesn't even pretend to measure the effect of its fraud or corrup-
tion prosecutions on crime rates in those areas" and "simply recites numbers of convictions
and amounts of recoveries and fines."
169 For example, the culture at Enron was famously intolerant of employee dissent and
so single-mindedly focused on profit that, twice a year, the lowest fifteen percent of each
group of employees was summarily replaced. PETER C. FUSARO & Ross M. MILLER,
WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 51-52 (2002) (discussing "rank and yank" cycle at
Enron); MIMI SWARTZ WITH SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 59 (2003) (describing six-month review as cross between "star
chamber" and "fraternity rush").
170 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 115 ("Large corporations have an almost
obsessive desire to prevent their dirty linen from being washed in public." (citation
omitted)).
171 Cf. id. at 110-16 (arguing that government-enforced self-regulation by industries is
more flexible than direct government regulation and could prove more effective at
preventing corporate malfeasance).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 82:311
May 2007] THE NEW CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 345
cooperating." 172 TFT involves escalating enforcement within the give-
and-take of a cooperative relationship, 173 whereas the government's
reactive posture in corporate fraud prosecutions-immediate escala-
tion from suspected violation to a potentially fatal indictment-lacks
flexibility and is ill-suited to creating a cooperative relationship.
Although the optimal level of deterrence necessary to address
private crimes like corporate fraud is contested, 174 as is the deterrent
impact of compliance programs themselves, 175 there is reason to ques-
tion whether compelled cooperation hinders enforcement. Comman-
deering internal investigations ultimately may prove to be a misguided
policy, one that causes more problems than it solves. Because it has
become standard practice for the government to ask for waivers and
disclosures, and because statements made during investigations often
form the only basis for criminal culpability, some corporations have
limited internal investigations to pare down the amount of potential
misconduct and proprietary information that must be revealed to the
172 Id. at 19, 21. Tit-for-tat (TFT) also improves information flow, which diminishes
when investigators adopt an adversarial posture during their initial interaction with a firm:
"Where inspectors walk into a workplace with the demeanor of a tough law enforcer, they
get little information. Where they walk in with the demeanor of a friendly persuader, they
get the information that can empower them as tough enforcers." Id. at 34; see also
Freeman, supra note 159, at 647 ("Even when firms expect to receive nothing more than
the favorable exercise of enforcement discretion in return for voluntary compliance with a
self-regulatory program, this is a significant benefit with implications for accountability.").
173 See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME & ACCOUNTA-
BILITY 140-45 (1993) (suggesting "pyramid" model of enforcement escalating from warn-
ings to prosecution). Ayres and Braithwaite likewise explain that room for escalation, with
persuasion forming the base of the "enforcement pyramid," is a key element of a successful
strategy of mutual cooperation:
Defection from cooperation is likely to be a less attractive proposition for busi-
ness when it faces a regulator with an enforcement pyramid than when con-
fronted with a regulator having only one deterrence option. This is true even
where the deterrence option available to the regulator is maximally potent.
Actually, it is especially true where the single deterrence option is cataclysmic.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 36. Here, indictment generally proves fatal, and
with no degrees of fault, the private sector has no "room for improvement" and little to
gain from public oversight. Cf Buell, supra note 18, at 502 (noting that when institutional
fault is imposed, "introspection within institutions is an adaptive behavior that can be crit-
ical to the success and, after failure, the recovery of firms").
174 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corpo-
rate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71,113-14 (noting that legal system
is unlikely to be "particularly adept at determining optimality" and suggesting-given "the
indeterminancy of adequate monitoring systems within any given firm"-setting bar for
any affirmative monitoring requirement "at a moderate height").
175 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Gov-
ernance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 510 (2003) ("[L]ittle evidence exists at all concerning the
effectiveness of internal compliance structures as a means to reduce socially harmful con-
duct .... [T]he evidence that does exist is decidedly mixed, with many of the most method-
ologically sound studies indicating the lack of effectiveness of such structures.").
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government. 176 The punishment paradigm socializes corporations to
seek avenues of resistance, 177 and cosmetic compliance programs may
overlook ordinary housekeeping and thus produce minimal damaging
evidence. 178 It is hardly a robust ethical standard "to aspire to get
through the day without being indicted. '179 But as Ayres and
Braithwaite found in their analysis of corporate compliance, "[w]hen
punishment rather than dialogue is in the foreground of regulatory
encounters, it is basic to human psychology that people will find this
humiliating, will resent and resist in ways that include abandoning
self-regulation."' 180 A more nuanced approach, one that draws not
only on the practice but also on the theory of hybrid enforcement,' 81
might capitalize on management's concern with good corporate citi-
zenship itself.182
176 See, e.g., Lorraine Woellert, Justice Softens Investigation Guidelines, BUSINESS-
WEEK.COM, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/dec2006/
db20061213_615165.htm ("[C]orporate higher-ups reportedly have refused to cooperate
with company lawyers in internal investigations, making it harder for businesses to get to
the roots of fraud.").
177 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 20 ("A strategy based mostly on punish-
ment fosters an organized business subculture of resistance to regulation wherein methods
of legal resistance and counterattack are incorporated into industry socialization.").
178 See Paine, supra note 112, at 106 (arguing that "integrity-based approach to ethics
management" that focuses on bringing about lawful conduct is more effective than legal
compliance model focused on narrow objective of "prevent[ing], detect[ing], and
punish[ing] legal violations").
179 Id. at 111 (quoting Richard Breeden, former SEC Chairman); see also GOBERT &
PUNCH, supra note 6, at 334 (arguing that to avoid reputational harm and litigation costs,
companies should "install and enforce a system of self-regulation that not only meets, but
exceeds, the bare minimum standards that the law demands" and should do so "guided by
the spirit of the law and not just its letter").
180 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 25; see also id. at 19-20 ("Punishment is
expensive; persuasion is cheap. A strategy based mostly on punishment wastes resources
on litigation that would be better spent on monitoring and persuasion.").
181 There is an interesting and unexamined parallel between the debates about public/
private partnership in corporate compliance and less reactive law enforcement approaches
to street crime, such as community policing. Community policing, at its best, emphasizes
openness, problem-solving, partnership, and attention to the causes and patterns of crime.
See generally, e.g., MALCOLM K. SPARROW ET AL., BEYOND 911: A NEW ERA FOR
POLICING 129-49 (1990) (discussing cooperative approaches to law enforcement).
182 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 22-23 (citing research supporting view that
management is concerned with compliance for its own sake and pointing to "evidence of
economically irrational compliance with the law"); cf Moohr, supra note 103, at 963 ("In
the end, criminal laws may have a greater impact on reinforcing behavior of the good
citizen than changing behavior of the bad citizen." (citing Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of
Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer &
Autumn 1997, at 23, 46-47 (1997))).
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B. Infringing on the Private Attorney-Client Relationship
The most obvious symptom of an unproductive entanglement of
public and private enforcement, and the first place to look for oppor-
tunities to restore equilibrium, is the forced waiver of corporate
attorney-client privilege. The Thompson Memorandum directed pros-
ecutors to consider an entity's refusal to waive its attorney-client and
work product protections as an indicator of noncooperation and
therefore a factor weighing in favor of indictment. 183 Like many
aspects of Thompson Memorandum procedure, this "consideration"
became a virtual requirement, one that placed corporate counsel in an
untenable position. How does counsel conduct an honest investiga-
tion knowing that all uncovered material will likely be ceded to the
government? 184 How do company investigators effectively question
employees when they cannot promise confidentiality?' 85 With post-
Enron prosecutorial tactics chilling internal investigations, from whom
can executives seek advice about compliance and liability?8 6 To put
it in the terms employed by Arlen and Kraakman in their analysis of
183 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 15, at 3 (stating that cooperation includes "the
corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to coop-
erate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate
attorney-client and work product protection").
184 See Mark Sherman, Firms Swap Info for Immunity: Details of Lawyer-Employee
Talks Help Stave Off Charges, COLUMBIAN (Clark County, Wash.), June 13, 2005, at El
("What it does is creates [sic] an environment within a company where nobody can feel
comfortable seeking legal advice from a lawyer because you can't have any assurance
sometime down the road that the company isn't going to waive the attorney-client privi-
lege." (quoting David Zornow, attorney for Computer Associates defendant Stephen
Richards) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
185 See David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World:
The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147
(2000) ("[A] wedge has been driven between senior management and other employees as
corporations rush to meet the requests of federal prosecutors for 'cooperation."').
186 See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DuQ. L. REV. 307, 321 (2003)
("The chilling effect on corporate self-scrutiny is obvious and there will be a serious
adverse impact on the ability of corporations to prevent the occurrence of future violations
of law, and of counsel to conduct meaningful and effective internal investigations.").
According to Zornow & Krakaur:
By waiving privileges prematurely, the corporate client may be deprived of
legal advice based on counsel's full development of the facts and an assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of the government's case. There is a danger
that prolonged discussions with counsel about possible options will be con-
strued later as an attempt to frustrate or even obstruct the government's
investigation.
Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 185, at 157; see also Timothy P. Harkness & Darren
LaVerne, Private Lies May Lead to Prosecution, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 2006, at S1 (noting
"growing concern within the criminal defense bar that the government was effectively
transforming company lawyers into an arm of the state").
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mitigation rules, commandeering corporate counsel ensures that the
"liability enhancement effect" of uncovering wrongdoing will exceed
the "deterrent effect" of monitoring, investigating, and reporting mis-
conduct. 187 Compelled waiver is thus fundamentally at odds with the
purpose of the privilege, which is "to allow clients to receive the most
competent legal advice from fully informed counsel, '188 and to
encourage "full and frank" communication with counsel.189 Corpora-
tions instead have the incentive to minimize internal documents and
refrain from giving advice that suggests even a hypothetical considera-
tion of fraudulent conduct. 190
The policy of compelling waivers of attorney-client privilege has
shifted as a result of political pressure. In November 2004, the Sen-
tencing Commission amended the Guidelines commentary to bring it
in line with the Thompson Memorandum, adding that waiver could be
a prerequisite to cooperation credit if "necessary in order to provide
timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to
the organization. '" 191 In April 2006, in response to activism in the
legal and business communities, the Commission unanimously agreed
to delete that language, and the change took effect on November 1,
2006.192 Formal revision of the Sentencing Guidelines, however, does
not alone make a pronounced difference. When it comes to assessing
credit for assisting an ongoing investigation at sentencing, corporate
cooperation is only as valuable as prosecutors say it is. Prosecutors
are unlikely to agree that a corporation that has retained its privilege
is cooperative in other respects, and a corporation will have an uphill
battle arguing to a court that it has helped the government more than
prosecutors are letting on. In most cases, moreover, the charging
187 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 707-08.
188 McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 629 & n.33 (citing, inter alia, United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ("To induce clients to make
[free and honest] communications, the privilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by
courts and commentators to be a necessity." (emphasis removed))).
189 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also id. at 389-95 (stating
that corporate attorney-client privilege extends to communications between all employees
and corporate counsel made in course of assisting with internal investigation in order to
facilitate "sound and informed advice"); White, supra note 39, at 821 ("[W]e want officers
of a company to consult counsel freely, not be afraid to consult because whatever is said
will surely be handed over to the government someday soon.").
190 See Fisher & Lattman, supra note 96, at 50 (quoting Stephen Saltzburg's observation
that notes of conversations seeking advice on compliance "could become a virtual admis-
sion of guilt if they indicate the employee recognized the potential illegality of his
actions").
191 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) cmt. 12 (2004).
192 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) cmt. 12 (2006); Vote by U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission Said to Stem Erosion of Attorney-Client Privilege, 74 U.S.L.W. No. 38,
at 2598 (Apr. 11, 2006).
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decision with respect to the corporate entity remains the critical junc-
ture in the case, so there is little opportunity to advance such
arguments.
A bipartisan coalition of interest groups1 93 has also pressed DOJ
to review and adjust its policies and practices relating to charging deci-
sions, and a recent report issued by the American Bar Association
concurred in that recommendation. 194 Ten former DOJ officials
expressed similar views in a letter to the Attorney General on
September 5, 2006, stating that the waiver policy expressed in the
Thompson Memorandum discourages corporate personnel from con-
sulting with counsel, thereby impeding "the lawyers' ability effectively
to counsel compliance with the law" and harming "not only the corpo-
rate client, but the investing public as well."' 195 According to the
letter:
193 The coalition includes the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Business
Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Association of Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers, the Association of Corporate Counsel, the American Chemistry
Council, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., the Financial Services Roundtable, Frontiers of
Freedom, the National Defense Industrial Association, the Retail Industry Leaders Associ-
ation, the Washington Legal Foundation, and the American Civil Liberties Union. ABA
TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT OF AUGUST 2006, at 2 n.5 (2006)
[hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/
materials/hod/emprights-report-adopted.pdf.
194 Id. at 17; Speakers Mull Fixes for Perceived Erosion of Corporations' Attorney-Client
Privilege, 74 U.S.L.W. No. 19, at 2294-96 (Nov. 22, 2005). The American Bar Association
told the Sentencing Commission that corporate employees would be less likely to consult
counsel if their communications were not confidential, and that the breakdown in commu-
nications would make it more difficult for attorneys to counsel clients on how to comply
with the law. See ABA Assails Sentencing Guideline Comment on Waiver of Attorney-
Client Privilege, 74 U.S.L.W. No. 74, at 2119-20 (Aug. 30, 2005). On May 2, 2006, ABA
President Michael Greco sent Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez a letter calling on him
to revise the Thompson Memorandum as follows:
Attorneys within the Department shall not take any action or assert any posi-
tion that directly or indirectly demands, requests or encourages an organiza-
tional entity or its attorneys to waive its attorney-client privilege or the
protections of the work product doctrine. Also, in assessing an entity's cooper-
ation, attorneys within the Department shall not draw any inference from the
entity's preservation of its attorney-client privilege and the protections of the
work product doctrine. At the same time, the voluntary decision by an organi-
zational entity to waive the attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
trine shall not be considered when assessing whether the entity provided
effective cooperation.
Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney
Gen. (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/060502
letter-acprivgonz.pdf.
195 See Former Federal Prosecutors Want Changes in DOJ Client Privilege Policy, 75
U.S.L.W. No. 9, at 2131-32 (Sept. 12, 2006). The signatories to the letter include former
Attorneys General Griffin Bell and Richard Thornburgh, as well as former Solicitors Gen-
eral Theodore Olson, Ken Starr, Walter Dellinger, and Seth Waxman.
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[Prosecutors] can get the information [they] need[ ] in ways that do
not impinge upon the attorney-client relationship-for example,
through corporate counsel identifying relevant data and documents
and assisting prosecutors in understanding them, making available
witnesses with knowledge of the events under investigation, and
conveying the results of internal investigations in ways that do not
implicate privileged material.1 96
On September 12, 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on the Thompson Memorandum's impact on the right to
counsel in corporate investigations, 197 and on December 7, 2006 Sen-
ator Arlen Specter proposed the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act,198 which would broadly prohibit prosecutors from negatively
assessing cooperation because a corporation asserted the privilege.
The McNulty Memorandum, issued on December 12, 2006, was
DOJ's response 99 and an effort to forestall reintroduction of the
196 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
197 152 CONG. REC. D942 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2006) (noting conclusion of Judiciary Com-
mittee hearing); see also Transcript, The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to
Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., Sept. 12,
2006 (LEXIS, Fed. News Serv.). A House Judiciary Subcommittee also explored the issue
of forced waivers of attorney-client privilege at a hearing in March 2006. Molly
McDonough, Justice Memo Stirs up Another Storm, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Apr. 28, 2006 (on
file with the New York University Law Review).
198 The legislation was not formally introduced, but Senator Specter brought it to the
Senate floor and put its text in the Congressional Record. 152 CONG. REC. S11438-39
(daily ed. Dec. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter). The bill would prohibit prosecutors
from "requesting that an organization waive its attorney-client privilege" or "conditioning
any charging decision or cooperation credit on waiver or non-waiver of privilege, the pay-
ment of an employee's legal fees, the continued employment of a person under investiga-
tion, or the signing of a joint defense agreement." Id. at S11439. Among the findings in
the bill is that "[w]aiver demands and other tactics of Government agencies are
encroaching on the constitutional rights and other legal protections of employees." Id.
Senator Specter introduced the legislation on January 4, 2007. Sen. Specter Continues
Efforts to Force DOJ to Stop Seeking Corporate Waiver of Privilege, 75 U.S.L.W. No. 28, at
2435 (Jan. 30, 2007).
199 On October 21, 2005, DOJ had issued another memorandum, the McCallum Memo-
randum, which was initially greeted as an attempt to address objections to compelled
waiver. The Memorandum, however, merely orders a district-by-district review of the
policy and requests that line prosecutors obtain approval before seeking waiver. The
McCallum Memorandum provides:
To ensure that federal prosecutors exercise appropriate prosecutorial discre-
tion under the principles of the Thompson Memorandum, some United States
Attorneys have established review processes for waiver requests that require
federal prosecutors to obtain approval from the United States Attorney or
other supervisor before seeking a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or
work product protection. Consistent with this best practice, you are directed
to establish a written waiver review process for your district or component....
[E]ach United States Attorney or component head retains the prosecutorial
discretion necessary, consistent with their circumstances, to seek timely, com-
plete, and accurate information from business organizations.
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Specter legislation in the 110th Congress. As detailed in Part I.C, the
explicit reference to the willingness to waive privileges as evidence of
corporate cooperation is deleted.200 Now, prosecutors must establish
a "legitimate need" for privileged information and seek DOJ approval
before requesting it.201 Should a corporation decline a request for
privileged information about legal advice it has received, prosecutors
are directed not to consider that refusal against the corporation in
making a charging decision.20 2 As the McNulty Memorandum itself
makes clear, however, there is little recourse for a defendant corpora-
tion pressed to waive privileges in violation of the stated policy. The
document, with all of the remaining Thompson Memorandum factors
intact, may continue to allow prosecutors to seek corporate submis-
sion without, in turn, creating any substantive or procedural rights
with which corporations can defend themselves.20 3
Furthermore, the new policy still grants corporations credit for
"voluntarily" waiving applicable privileges, which can make refusal
just as costly. 20 4 Although the McNulty Memorandum places new
constraints on the circumstances under which prosecutors may request
waivers, prosecutors rarely need to request them when they are
empowered to make the bottom-line assessment of whether corpora-
tions qualify as "cooperative."
Modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines and the Thompson
Memorandum will provide some relief from the consequences of com-
pelled cooperation, but only at the margins.20 5 The harmful side
Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S.
Attorneys 1 (Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter McCallum Memorandum], available at http://law
professors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf. In
fact, observers expected that the McCallum Memorandum would simply expedite requests
for privilege waivers by streamlining and institutionalizing the approval process. See
McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 633 ("The McCallum Memo ensures that each U.S.
Attorney across the country will be ready to strike with a demand for a privilege waiver.").
200 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 4.
201 Id. at 8-9.
202 Id. at 10.
203 See id. at 19 (noting that memorandum provides internal guidance only and "is not
intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal").
204 Id. at 10 ("Prosecutors may always favorably consider a corporation's acquiescence
to the government's waiver request in determining whether a corporation has cooperated
in the government's investigation.").
205 Other potential privilege reforms aimed at the counterproductive effects of current
practices include the much-debated self-evaluative privilege and the recently proposed
selective waiver, which might increase the likelihood of self-policing by offering the shelter
of confidentiality. Selective waiver is controversial, with the majority of courts disfavoring
retention of the privilege after any voluntary disclosure. See In re Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302-04 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
selective waiver); Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated
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effects of compelled cooperation and intrusion into the sphere of cor-
porate governance via DPAs remain. Executive branch self-regula-
tion in the form of nonbinding internal guidelines does little to
address the coercive atmosphere of threatened entity indictment.
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
COMMANDEERING INTERNAL INVESTIGATORS
In light of the government's control over internal investigators
under the current paradigm of corporate criminal procedure, the con-
stitutional safeguards that apply when public officials question targets
should extend to the context of employee interviews. Against the
backdrop of DPAs and the requirements of the Thompson and
Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381,406-14 & n.198
(2005) (criticizing claims of selective waiver and collecting cases rejecting and recognizing
such claims). A proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Proposed Rule
502, provides:
[A] disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-
client privilege or work product protection-when made to a federal public
office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
authority-does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor
of non-governmental persons or entities.
Memorandum from David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure, to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 5 (May 15, 2006), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/Excerpt-EVReportPub.pdf. The proposed rule was published for
public comment on August 10, 2006. Public Comment Sought, Hearings Set on Proposed
New Privilege Waiver Rule, 75 U.S.L.W. No. 9, at 2141 (Sept. 12, 2006). If ultimately
enacted by Congress as required by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000),
the rule would clarify the scope of waiver triggered by partial disclosure and the conse-
quences of inadvertent disclosure in the contexts of the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection. More significantly, the rule would permit selective waiver in making
disclosures to a federal office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, enforcement, or
investigative authority. Change to Evidence Rule Would Allow Partial Waiver to Govern-
ment Agencies, 75 U.S.L.W. No. 1, at 2007 (July 4, 2006). The idea behind this revision is
to prevent confidential materials turned over to DOJ from providing a template for civil
litigation. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 52, at 17 ("Each pre-trial agreement con-
tains a plaintiff's lawyer's dream .... "). The proposed rule is stalled, however, and the
provision on selective waiver of privilege is likely to be withdrawn in light of opposition
from the plaintiffs' bar as well as defense lawyers. Selective Waiver of Privilege Likely to
Be Pulled from Proposed Rule of Evidence, 75 U.S.L.W. No. 30, at 2471, 2471 (Feb. 13,
2007).
Another approach for which some commentators have argued is the preservation of a
self-evaluative privilege to protect aspects of internal investigations. E.g., Ronald J. Allen
& Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investiga-
tions, 12 J. CoRP. L. 355, 379-81 (1987) (suggesting that self-evaluative privilege could
result in more effective management and more law-abiding corporate behavior); Michael
Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compli-
ance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1997) ("The self-evaluative privilege is
intended to promote confidential self-analysis and self-criticism; it often protects evalua-
tions, recommendations for change, and internal reviews against requests for disclosure.").
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McNulty Memoranda, the Fifth Amendment should afford employees
some protection against the adverse consequences of coerced disclo-
sures, even when an agent of the corporation poses the actual
questions.
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that, "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. '206 For Fifth Amendment protections to
apply in the context of compliance investigations, two elements must
be satisfied. First, statements taken under these circumstances must
be compelled.2 0 7 Second, that compulsion must actually or function-
ally be brought to bear by a state actor.20 8 When internal investigators
acting pursuant to a DPA pressure employees to answer questions
under the threat of job loss, both of these requirements are met.
A. Importing Garrity Immunity
The Supreme Court has long recognized that not all compulsion
takes place in police interrogation rooms under bright white lights.209
In a series of decisions beginning with Garrity v. New Jersey,210 the
Court described the conditional threat of job loss if a defendant does
not waive the privilege against self-incrimination as coercive.211 In
Garrity, investigators questioned the defendant police officers in con-
nection with a state inquiry into the alleged fixing of traffic tickets. 212
Before being questioned by state agents, each officer was warned that
206 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
207 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) ("[T]he Court has never on
any ground ... applied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition
or use of evidence which ... did not involve compelled testimonial self-incrimination of
some sort.").
208 E.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 190 (1988)
("[Djeprivation of a federal right may be attributed to the State if it resulted from a state-
created rule and the party charged with the deprivation can fairly be said to [be] a state
actor." (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))).
209 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (stating, in due process
case, that "blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisi-
tion"); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-40 (1940) (holding that unconstitutional
coercion, for due process purposes, can be mental as well as physical); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1897) (extending prohibition on compelled testimony to both
"physical" and "moral" compulsion).
210 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
211 Id. at 500 (holding that evidence received from police officers required either to
answer questions asked in administrative inquiry or to risk losing their jobs was coerced
and that subsequent use of it violated Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). In Garrity, the
police officers were actually advised that they had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
answer, although to do so might mean job loss, id. at 494, whereas in the case of corporate
investigations, employees generally are not apprised that they have Fifth Amendment
rights at all.
212 Id. at 494.
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any statements could be used against him, that he had the privilege to
refuse to answer, but that if he refused, he would be subject to
removal from office pursuant to New Jersey's forfeiture-of-office
statute. Over their objections, some of the officers' answers were then
used in their prosecutions for conspiracy to obstruct the administra-
tion of traffic laws. The Supreme Court held that admitting the state-
ments into evidence against the defendants constituted coerced self-
incrimination. 213 Subsequent cases have extended the privilege to
preclude the admission of statements by defendants such as attorneys
who were threatened with disbarment for refusing to submit to inter-
rogation by regulators. 214
According to Garrity, the government may not threaten action
that coerces a public employee into forfeiting her right against self-
incrimination, and it must grant an employee immunity from the use
of compelled statements in a subsequent criminal prosecution before
she is required to answer questions about her public responsibili-
ties. 215 "[W]hen a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict
potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that
testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and cannot
be used against the declarant in a subsequent criminal prosecution. '216
Put another way, a governmental threat of termination is coercive
because it would be unconstitutional to carry out that threat as an
adverse consequence of invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.217
There is no precise metric of coercion, and gauging it is a normative
213 Id. at 500.
214 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) ("The threat of disbarment and the loss of
professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of
compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege."). Although refusal to answer such
questions can be grounds for disbarment, and failure to cooperate may likewise lead to the
termination of a private employee, the use of statements elicited with the threat of these
adverse consequences is constitutionally prohibited. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 279 (1968) ("[The Fifth Amendment] does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its
ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty of the loss
of employment."); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280, 284 (1968) (holding it unconstitutional for public employees to be presented with
"choice between surrendering their constitutional rights or their jobs"); cf Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 436 (1984) (holding that requiring probationer to "choose between
making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining
silent" would be impermissible).
215 See Uniformed Sanitation, 392 U.S. at 284 (arguing that public employees required to
answer questions "on pain of dismissal from public employment" would ordinarily be able
to invoke their "right to immunity" in later proceedings).
216 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977).
217 See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEo. L.J. 1, 45 (2001) ("To challenge an offer on grounds that it
constitutes coercion is ... essentially to mount an anticipatory attack on the performing of
the act that the state threatens.").
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inquiry about the appropriate level of government force.2 18 But a
starting point is the "moral baseline" entitlement to maintain self-
protective silence without sanction.219
The government's current practices violate that baseline when
conditional threats take the form: "If you do not waive Fifth Amend-
ment protections, then you will be fired." Corporations receive nega-
tive assessments of their own cooperation if they fail to terminate
employees who invoke constitutional protections, and the threat of
job loss is thus routine and real.220 With every statement in an
internal investigation of potential significance, exposed employees,
like the police officers in Garrity, are confronted with a version of the
"cruel trilemma" of self-incrimination, perjury, or contempt:22' They
can admit wrongdoing and incriminate themselves (or others), falsely
deny and in doing so commit a crime, or refuse to answer and face
summary dismissal from their jobs.2 2 2 An employee who confesses
under such circumstances does so while between a "rock" and a
"whirlpool." 223
The Court has recognized that job loss alone is a sufficiently
severe sanction to coerce a statement within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment when an individual subjectively believes that she must
speak or face job loss and when it is objectively reasonable for her to
hold that belief. Employee statements obtained by proxy investiga-
tors in government-directed compliance investigations meet those
218 Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its
Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 247 (2004) ("[C]ompulsion and
incrimination are both continuous variables-questions of degree.").
219 See M~ximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. (forth-
coming 2006) (manuscript at 11-12 & n.33, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractjid=931669) (defining baseline as "what is predicted or morally expected in a
situation" and using this baseline concept to identify coercive plea proposals (citing
ROBERT NoZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 23-31 (1997) (defining baseline as "expected course
of events"))).
220 See, e.g., Buell, supra note 18, at 505 ("In order to obtain the benefits of cooperation
with the government, principally avoidance or mitigation of entity criminal sanctions, firms
typically require such employee cooperation on pain of employment consequence (usually
firing).").
221 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
222 See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 447
(2000) (explaining that any move made by suspect in initial confrontation "inevitably
increases his chances of conviction and thus worsens his position").
223 Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498 (1967) ("Where the choice is 'between
the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other.").
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requirements. 224  As one internal investigator involved in the
WorldCom case recounted:
The company had pledged complete and full cooperation, and we
were determined to get to the bottom of things. The employees had
a choice. They were either going to give what we considered to be
full and credible testimony and tell us everything they knew about
what had gone on, or they were going to be fired right there, on the
spot, and we were going to refer their names to every law-enforce-
ment authority who would take our call. That is their choice. 225
Nor is job loss the only economic sanction that constitutes coer-
cion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 22 6 The Supreme
Court has held, for example, that there is no "difference of constitu-
tional magnitude between the threat of job loss to an employee of the
State, and a threat of loss of contracts to a [government] con-
tractor. '227 In Lefkowitz v. Turley,228 state law provided that if a con-
tractor refused to surrender his constitutional privilege before a grand
jury, his existing state contracts would be canceled and he would be
barred from future contracts with the State for five years.2 29 The
Court saw no constitutional distinction between discharging an
employee and depriving a contractor of the opportunity to secure
public work; the Court's focus was on the State's effort to compel
testimony by imposing some economic sanction as the price of
invoking the Fifth Amendment right.230  Similarly, in Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham,231 dismissal from unpaid party offices that carried pres-
224 United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing United States
v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1112 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also United States ex rel. Sanney v.
Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[W]e [do not] perceive any consequence
flowing from the fact that the threat in the present case was conveyed through a private
employer, admittedly acting as an agent of the police, rather than through a person on the
public payroll.").
225 Panel Discussion, Fordham University School of Law Center for Corporate, Securities
& Financial Law: Bigger Carrots and Bigger Sticks: Issues and Developments in Corporate
Sentencing, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 161, 179 (2006) (statement of Richard
Breeden, former SEC Chairman and court-appointed monitor in WorldCom investigation).
In describing his interactions with WorldCom employees during the internal investigation,
Breeden further stated that he approached them as follows: "This is your Judgment Day,
right here and right now, and you have to decide which side of the law you are going to be
on. Are you going to cooperate fully and unburden your conscience or are you not?" Id.
226 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) ("[D]irect economic sanc-
tions and imprisonment are not the only penalties capable of forcing the self-incrimination
which the Amendment forbids.").
227 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973); see also id. at 85 ("[A]nswers elicited
upon the threat of the loss of employment are compelled.").
228 414 U.S. 70.
229 Id. at 71.
230 Id. at 83.
231 431 U.S. 801.
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tige and political influence was deemed "inherently coercive" 232
because of the indirect economic consequences and reputational costs.
If the threatened loss of contracting privileges or the removal from an
unpaid office for failure to provide incriminating information can
amount to coercion under Garrity,233 then so too should the proxy
pressure to assist an ongoing public investigation or face termination
of employment and the withdrawal of other forms of institutional sup-
port such as indemnification. 234
Potential corporate defendants questioned in the course of an
investigation commanded and largely directed by the government
should be able to avail themselves of Fifth Amendment protections.
That interviews might be initiated while a DPA is merely under nego-
tiation does not change the analysis. It is clear, for example, that the
Fifth Amendment protects against any disclosure in the course of an
administrative investigation that an individual reasonably believes
could be used against her (either directly or indirectly) in a criminal
prosecution. 235 An individual may not be forced to answer questions
"in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. ' '2 36
And a witness may refuse to answer questions "unless and until he is
232 Id. at 807.
233 These precedents are settled law, but they rest, to be sure, on a broad view of coer-
cion. According to Alan Wertheimer's theory of coercion, for example, an employee's
statement in the face of these threats may be nonvolitional because the external pressures
diminish mental capacity, and because the fact that an employee gains nothing by con-
fessing leaves reason to doubt that the choice to speak reflects her underlying preferences.
See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 118, 171 (1987). In many cases, confession is a short-
sighted and potentially irrational choice, given the likelihood of job loss in any event, and
thus it is a decision that employees will not merely "regret having to make" but will actu-
ally "regret having made." See id. at 171; id. at 118 ("Although it may be in the short-term
interest of the one interrogated to confess (to stop the interrogation), it is typically no
more in his long-term interest than a decision to refuse life-saving surgery because the pain
is too much to bear.").
234 Cf Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2633 n.30 (1996) ("Some private sanctions ... (for
example, a discharge from employment), are more severe than some criminal sanctions
(for example, unsupervised probation)."); ABA REPORT, supra note 193, at 17-18 (arguing
that withdrawing attorneys' fees to punish uncooperative employees, manipulating joint
defense agreements, and terminating employees who exercise right to silence is singularly
coercive). The McNulty Memorandum ostensibly curtails this practice by stating that
"[p]rosecutors generally should not take into account whether a corporation is advancing
attorneys' fees to employees or agents under investigation and indictment." McNulty
Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11.
235 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
236 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (concerning two architects for New York
State who refused to waive privilege in grand jury investigation into corruption in public
contracting practices); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (holding that privi-
lege is available to witnesses in civil proceedings).
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protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evi-
dence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he
is a defendant."237
B. Delegated Coercion
The pressure at issue in internal investigations pursuant to DPAs
is, of course, more attenuated than the public employee scenarios.
When corporations themselves are compelling employee statements,
but doing so at the behest of the government, the government's
wrongful threat is delegated.
The KPMG case again provides an example. KPMG's DPA with
the government contemplates total disclosure of the content of
internal interviews, full and active cooperation in identifying culpable
employees, and the production of all potential employee witnesses.238
In August 2006, a federal court in the Southern District of New York
ruled that statements by former KPMG partners to the government
were compelled. 239 The court concluded that the government "both
through the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO,
quite deliberately coerced, and in any case significantly encouraged,
KPMG to pressure its employees to surrender their Fifth Amendment
rights. '240 Prosecutors, according to the court's order, "brandished a
big stick-[they] threatened to indict KPMG." They also "held out a
very large carrot"-they suggested KPMG could avoid indictment if it
would deliver to the government "employees who would talk, not-
withstanding their constitutional right to remain silent. '241
That corporations are expected to "deliver" compliant
employees, and even remove obstacles to their prosecution, is
expressly set forth in the Thompson Memorandum, and the McNulty
Memorandum likewise states that whether or not the government
labels a corporation cooperative depends in part on "a corporation's
promise of support to culpable employees and agents. ' 242 The
Thompson and McNulty Memoranda also encourage prosecutors to
consider whether a corporation has provided "information to the
employees about the government's investigation pursuant to a joint
237 Turley, 414 U.S. at 78.
238 KPMG DPA, supra note 59, [ 8.
239 United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
240 Id. at 337.
241 Id. at 337-38.
242 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11; see also Thompson Memorandum,
supra note 15, at 8 (directing prosecutors to consider corporation's protection of its
employees and facilitation of investigation when granting immunity from prosecution).
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defense agreement. '243 In a June 2006 ruling in the KPMG case, the
court reasoned that employee defendants "are entitled to a fair
shake" but do not get one when the corporation acts as a proxy for the
government.244 The requirement of "fairness in criminal proceed-
ings," the court wrote, "applies to the structure and conduct of the
entire criminal justice system, ' 245 and the Thompson Memorandum
violates this fairness principle by sanctioning "extrajudicial action by
the government that deliberately or recklessly tilts the playing field
against a criminal defendant. ' 246 There is an obvious objection to the
KPMG court's assertion that employees have a substantive due pro-
cess entitlement to a public corporation's resources-which may
themselves represent ill-gotten gains from accounting irregularities-
to defend themselves against fraud charges.247 As a descriptive
matter, however, the practice of threatening to withdraw legal support
from employees underscores the impropriety of the threat and thus
the applicability of a different prong of the Fifth Amendment: the
privilege against self-incrimination.
243 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11; Thompson Memorandum, supra note
15, at 8.
244 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Enterasys
Networks executives recently obtained a continuance from a New Hampshire judge for an
investigation into whether the government exerted undue influence to cut off their legal
payments, which have since been restored. Lynnley Browning, Judges Press Companies
That Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at Cl; Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures
Firms Not to Pay Staff Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at B1.
245 Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
246 Id. at 362 n.159. It is not clear, however, that individual defendants possess the sub-
stantive due process right cited by the court "to obtain and use in order to prepare a
defense resources lawfully available to [them], free of knowing or reckless government
interference." Id. at 361. Perhaps a better argument is that withdrawing financial support
from employees unless they waive Fifth Amendment protections imposes an unconstitu-
tional condition. See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593
(1926) (rejecting State's attempt to compel "surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable
privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold"). Mitchell Berman asks when
"the principle that a state may not do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly"
trumps "the principle that the greater power (to withhold the benefit entirely) includes the
lesser power (to grant it on condition)." Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of
Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 873 (1998). The answer,
Berman suggests, turns on whether the government's motives-in this case to shortcut the
investigation-are legitimate. Id. at 874-75.
247 In those cases in which employees have a statutory right to attorneys' fees under
state law or pursuant to the explicit terms of the employment contract, the issue is more
straightforward. Indeed, the revisions to the McNulty Memorandum now explicitly pro-
vide that "a corporation's compliance with governing state law and its contractual obliga-
tions [to advance employee attorneys' fees] cannot be considered a failure to cooperate."
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 16, at 11.
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Because the prosecutors' conduct in obtaining a statement is a
central consideration in the admissibility of a confession, 248 the back-
ground noise of this government interference in an employee's poten-
tial defense matters a great deal. Although employee statements need
not be "voluntary in the sense that [defendants] wanted to make them
or that they were completely spontaneous, like a confession to a
priest, a lawyer, or a psychiatrist, ' 249 nor can they result from
improper interrogation. The prospect of self-financing a defense in a
large fraud prosecution may be more disastrous than job loss, 250 and
to threaten it "infect[s]" employee statements with coercion.25 1
The constitutional significance of derivative compulsion is contro-
versial because its logical consequences, particularly in the employ-
ment context, could be "absurd. '25 2 Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow,
for example, have argued that even in the case of government employ-
ment, "no impermissible Fifth Amendment compulsion exists from
reasonable employment decisions because no one is compelled to
work for the government in the first place. ' 253 Amar and Lettow's
argument, however, rests in part on the notion that employers are per-
fectly entitled to terminate employees when their failure to provide
information raises doubts about their integrity. 254 To be sure, the
Fifth Amendment does not preclude employers from asking questions
or from terminating employees who refuse to answer them. What it
does prohibit, however, is the in-court use of any statements obtained
from employees under threat of termination, if that threat is relayed
from the government.25 5 Even Amar and Lettow acknowledge that
248 See, e.g., Allen & Mace, supra note 218, at 256 (suggesting that prevailing Fifth
Amendment decision rule "locat[es] the various types of pressure along a continuum and
us[es] social conventions to determine how much pressure is permissible").
249 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 186 (1953).
250 See Bucy, supra note 155, at 312 ("Defending against criminal prosecution can be
financially disastrous. Conviction likely will result in painful and publicly visible changes in
lifestyle for the offender and her family.").
251 Cf Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967) (holding that statements made
under threat of job loss "were infected by the coercion" and could not "be sustained as
voluntary").
252 Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 868 (1995) (criticizing extension of Fifth
Amendment privilege to economic coercion taking place outside of criminal justice
system).
253 Id. at 906.
254 Id. at 868 (querying whether President Reagan could have "refused to appoint
Oliver North to be Secretary of State-or fired him from his subcabinet White House
office, for that matter-on the simple ground that North's invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment raised sufficient doubt about his worthiness to serve in a position of high honor and
power").
255 Cf., e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1791, 1816-17 (1992) ("An antiharassment policy that a private employer creates
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the pressure the government applies when it leverages its sovereign
power in the employment context can pass a point beyond which it
becomes an "unconstitutional condition. ' 256  The government's
demands for proprietary information and unprecedented intervention
into employee relations in recent cases such as the KPMG prosecution
pass this point.
Neither the doctrinal requirements nor the theoretical underpin-
nings of the Fifth Amendment privilege turn on a distinction between
direct and delegated coercion. Converting the public pressure of a
pending indictment into the private weight of professional and per-
sonal ruin does not permit the government to extract, and introduce in
a courtroom, statements that employees otherwise would not have
made. Given a broad reading, the doctrinal requirement of "com-
pelled testimonial self-incrimination" encompasses employee state-
ments in internal investigations commandeered by the government.
The Supreme Court has noted that the Fifth Amendment requires a
liberal construction to prevent "stealthy encroachment" on, and the
"gradual deprecation" of, the rights it secures. 257 The plight of indi-
vidual employees within current corporate cooperation doctrine rep-
resents just such an erosion "by well-intentioned, but mistakenly,
over-zealous executive officers. '258
Even the narrowest conceptions of the rationales that animate
the Fifth Amendment support its extension to the government's use of
coerced employee statements in the war on corporate crime. The self-
incrimination privilege itself is not beyond controversy: David
Dolinko has systematically discredited its conventional rationales,259
and other commentators have noted that it emerged as a "procedural
remedy for a substantive wrong, ' '260 that it is fundamentally ahistor-
ical, and that it is a "mandate in search of a meaning. '261 Because its
on its own would raise no First Amendment difficulties. But the fact that an employer has
the right to do something to its employees does not mean that the government may force
the employer to do it.").
256 Amar & Lettow, supra note 252, at 906.
257 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); see also Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (suggesting that it is through "obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form" that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing").
258 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304.
259 See generally David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1986) (arguing that privilege is unsupported by
viable principles and that it is mere "historical relic").
260 William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1228, 1231
(1988).
261 Amar & Lettow, supra note 252, at 922; see also John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth:
The Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 825, 908 (1999) (arguing that privilege is "an inconsistent combination of difficult-to-
justify broad rules and a hodgepodge of miscellaneous exceptions").
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justification is unmoored, there are various points of entry for an
argument to extend the privilege, including the nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum provision of canon law that "no one is obliged to produce
himself," natural law theories of self-preservation, historical aversion
to inquisitorial-based schemes (the anticoercion rationale), and intu-
itions about both autonomy and fair play in criminal proceedings.2 62
The example of the Computer Associates executives indicted
exclusively for conversations with the law firm they retained to facili-
tate cooperation underscores the relevance of nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum. Those defendants "produced themselves" for prosecution;
they found themselves defending against obstruction charges only
because of their efforts to achieve compliance. By submitting to inter-
views, they were "ensnared by ambiguous circumstances 263 and cre-
ated some of the very offenses for which they later incurred liability.
Respect for the instinct of self-preservation is perhaps the most
enduring rationale for the privilege.2 64 It finds expression in Justice
Goldberg's "cruel trilemma" formulation from Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission.265 Employees confronted in the course of compliance
investigations governed by DPAs have no self-preservation option at
262 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (cataloguing various justi-
fications for privilege).
263 See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957) (citation omitted) (noting
that invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege does not imply guilt, as one of privilege's
"basic functions" is protection of innocent persons).
264 This rationale is enduring but not uncontroversial. Some courts and commentators
find the justification self-evident. E.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field,
J., dissenting) ("The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own
guilt is obvious to every one, and needs no illustration."); R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a
Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 36 (1981) ("[W]e may hesi-
tate to say that someone has a moral duty to bring conviction and imprisonment upon
himself."). Others have not viewed the force of the trilemma argument as so clear-cut. It
is a problem, Justice Scalia wrote in Brogan v. United States, "wholly of the guilty suspect's
own making." 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998). An innocent person, on the other hand, "will not
find himself in a similar quandary (as one commentator has put it, the innocent person
lacks even a 'lemma')." Id. (citing Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the
Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1016 (1996)). The
argument that it is cruel to make a defendant an instrument of her own condemnation has
also been widely criticized in the academic literature. See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note
252, at 890 ("[A]s a descriptive theory, the psychological cruelty argument simply does not
hold water."); Dolinko, supra note 259, at 1094-95 (noting excruciating choices faced by
witnesses such as rape victims, and parents compelled to testify against their children, and
arguing that "[i]t seems perverse to suggest that a legal system willing to impose such
extremely difficult choices on witnesses who may be innocent of any wrongdoing, or on...
victims of a vicious crime, would balk at imposing such a choice on people most of whom
face a 'trilemma' only because they broke the law"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind
Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 318 (1991)
(contending that trilemma is cruel only to guilty and that people cannot "escape hard
choices that are a consequence of their own voluntary decisions").
265 378 U.S. at 55.
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all; they are between the "rock and the whirlpool" portrayed in
Garrity 266
A corollary to the self-preservation argument is the anticoercion
rationale, which has long been recognized as a crucial element of the
privilege. The Supreme Court observed in Knapp v. Schweitzer
267
that the "sole-although deeply valuable-purpose of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the security of the
individual against the exertion of the power of the Federal Govern-
ment to compel incriminating testimony with a view to enabling that
same Government to convict a man out of his own mouth." 268 Like-
wise, in the Garrity-Lefkowitz line of cases discussed above, 269 the
Court reiterated that "the touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is com-
pulsion. ' 270 Under even the most parsimonious reading of the privi-
lege-that it serves simply to prohibit "improper methods of
interrogation" 271-it might apply to scenarios of delegated coercion.
When KPMG employees were confronted with the unsubtle threat
either to give statements or to lose both their jobs and any means of
mounting a defense, they arguably experienced an improper method
of interrogation. 272
Although "the rule excluding involuntary confessions does not
protect against hard choices when a person's serious misconduct has
placed him in a position where these are inevitable," 273 to require
unprotected submission to interviews makes employees complicit in
the deprivation of their liberty and thereby crosses the constitutional
line. The KPMG court recognized, for example, that because the gov-
ernment coerced KPMG to apply pressure to its employees, prosecu-
266 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498 (1967).
267 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
268 Id. at 380; see also Green, supra note 116, at 32-33 (citing "moral intuitions about
the right of self-preservation" and "basic human right not to assist the government in
causing one's own destruction").
269 See supra text accompanying notes 209-34.
270 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977); cf. Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (applying rule that Fifth Amendment bars introduction of coerced
statements regardless of source of coercion, in case predating state action doctrine).
271 Alschuler, supra note 234, at 2626.
272 United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("KPMG coerced
[the defendant's] appearance by conditioning payment of his legal fees on his appearance
and cooperation.").
273 United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 872 (2d Cir. 1975). According to the
Solomon court's reasoning, statements made to the New York Stock Exchange were not
protected because the consequences to the questioned officer of a brokerage firm were
uncertain. Id. "Garrity's interpretation of the privilege," the court held, "applies only
when the interrogator has the power to compel testimony against which the privilege
would be a shield and the state has sought to shatter the shield by the threat that raising it
will involve consequences as devastating as in that case." Id. at 870-71.
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tors were able to secure cooperation and "waivers of constitutional
rights that the government itself could not obtain. '2 74 The court's
opinion echoes Barbara Babcock's observation that "when the state
may deprive a person of all liberty,.., the duty of the citizen to coop-
erate with the government comes to an end," 275 as well as Justice
Fortas's view that the individual has "the sovereign right to refuse to
cooperate; to meet the state on terms as equal as their respective
strength would permit; and to defend himself by all means within his
power-including the instrument of silence. '276
The intuitive objection to the use of compelled employee state-
ments-sought and obtained through an investigative "partnership"
between the employer and the government-is that the practice devi-
ates from baseline Fifth Amendment requirements. The Fifth
Amendment is intended to "remove[ ] the temptation to employ short
cuts to conviction that demean official integrity. ' 277 Coercing a
waiver of the right to silence through a delegated threat of termina-
tion is just such a bypass, and public constitutional norms should pre-
vent it despite the formalism of the state action requirement.
274 Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
275 Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1982) (discussing Fifth Amendment
concern with individual autonomy and space "free from the government's malignant or
benign interference"); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261-62 (1967) (Fortas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Fifth Amendment privilege pro-
tects individual from cooperating in deprivation of his own liberty); LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FiFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 432
(1968) (stating that Fifth Amendment requires "determination of guilt or innocence" in
our society to be made "by just procedures in which the accused made no unwilling contri-
bution to his conviction"). But see Amar & Lettow, supra note 252, at 893 ("At times, the
fair balance idea collapses into a sporting theory of justice-the idea that we should boost
the odds for criminals just to keep the game interesting, above and beyond the valuable
and important 'handicap' that the government must prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt."); Dolinko, supra note 259, at 1139 ("It is simply not true that a citizen is absolved
of all duty 'to cooperate with the government' when his liberty is at stake-he is not, for
example, free to ignore a summons, to flee to a foreign country, or to suborn perjury.").
276 Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, CLEV. B. ASS'N
J., Apr. 1954, at 91, 98; see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) ("[The Fifth
Amendment] requir[es] the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load .... " (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251, at 317 (John T.
McNaughton ed., rev. 1961)))).
277 Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. Cr. REV. 193,
209, quoted in Dolinko, supra note 259, at 1066.
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C. Accountable State Action
As a general matter, of course, private employers are not consid-
ered state actors.278 Nevertheless, when the actions of private
employers induce employees to provide incriminating evidence
against themselves-in order to comply with an existing DPA or to
position the corporation in ongoing negotiations for a DPA-their
actions may be "fairly attributable" to the government within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.279 For example, the KPMG court
found the requisite state action present even though the actual
threat-cutting off payment of legal expenses for any employee who
refused to talk to the government or invoked the Fifth Amendment-
came from KPMG. 280
Although the Fifth Amendment does not apply to entirely private
investigative activity,281 investigators who are privately employed but
functionally conscripted by the government straddle the public/private
boundary. I am mindful of Jody Freeman's admonition that "scholars
who seek to constrain the private exercise of authority through the
extension of constitutional limits to nonstate actors face an uphill
battle. '28 2 Nevertheless, internal investigations expressly prompted
and directed by prosecutors fit within the "extraordinary cases" in
which Freeman acknowledges that a state action argument may suc-
ceed. 28 3 A private employer can terminate an employee who refuses
to cooperate with the government, and the Fifth Amendment places
no constraints on the private use of economic pressure to extract
incriminating statements, but those lines of authority can be distin-
guished from the case of a corporation acting pursuant to a DPA. The
government's mere approval of a private party's initiatives is insuffi-
cient to establish state action, but the government "can be held
278 For an insightful and comprehensive discussion of the neglected state action problem
in criminal procedure, see Sklansky, supra note 160, at 1229-69.
279 See D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding that actions of private entity are "fairly attributable" to government where
state "'has exercised coercive power [over a private decision]"' (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)) (alteration in original)).
280 United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 334-35, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
281 A long line of Miranda cases, for example, has limited the Fifth Amendment's scope
to governmental agencies. E.g., United States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335, 337 (2d Cir.
1970) ("The federal exclusionary rule enforcing adherence to the intendment of the Fifth
Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment, has long been construed as 'a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority' and not as 'a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies."' (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921))); Sklansky, supra
note 160, at 1232, 1239-44 ("[L]ower courts without exception have refused to impose the
prophylactic protections of Miranda on private interrogators.").
282 Freeman, supra note 159, at 579.
283 Id.
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responsible for a private decision .. when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State." 284
Typically, state action issues arise when "a private party has taken
the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the ques-
tion is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive
conduct as state action. '285 Precedents on determining the presence
of state action "have not been a model of consistency, '' 286 and
attempts to tease out public elements of compulsion by private
employers are "seriously incomplete. ' 287 Among the traditional tests
is whether the incidents of governmental authority aggravate the
injury caused by the private actor. 288 Another formulation is that
challenged conduct is "fairly attributable to the State '289 when it is
caused by a person for whom the government is "responsible 290
because "he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid
from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to
284 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
285 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
286 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting); see also Louis Michael Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT.
379, 391 (1993) ("No area of constitutional law is more confusing and contradictory than
state action."); Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not Just a Private Club: Self Regu-
latory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 453, 465 ("Judging where the government sphere should end and the private one
should begin . . . has proved to be an elusive task.").
287 Alschuler, supra note 234, at 2633 n.30.
288 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 627 (holding that peremptory challenge by private civil liti-
gant constitutes state action); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54 (1992)
(holding that race-based peremptory challenge by criminal defendant constitutes state
action). That the incidents of governmental authority aggravate the injury of compelled
statements in internal interviews is made clear when those statements are subsequently
introduced in court against the employee defendant. See John M. Burkoff, Not So Private
Searches and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 666 (1981) ("When the State
affirmatively accepts illegally seized evidence in its criminal justice system, thereby author-
izing or encouraging actions by private parties that would be unconstitutional if performed
by governmental officials, it ignores reality to ... assert that there is no 'sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action."' (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345,351 (1974))); cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1971) (stating
that to allow introduction at criminal trial of testimony obtained through coercion in other
proceedings would "practically nullif[y]" Fifth Amendment privilege). But see Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) ("The most outrageous behavior by a private party
seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible
under the Due Process Clause.").
289 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
290 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("[C]onstitutional standards are invoked
only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the
plaintiff complains.").
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the State."'2 9' Cases such as Blum v. Yaretsky2 92 suggest that when a
corporation receives "significant encouragement" to assist the govern-
ment in a criminal investigation, the corporation is acting as a govern-
ment proxy and its acts can be attributed to the government for
purposes of constitutional analysis.2 93 The Ninth Circuit has similarly
held that the government "cannot escape liability when it compels a
result, even though the government does not actually engage in the
unlawful act but, instead, pressures another to do so."' 294 The threat of
Arthur Andersen's fate brings significant pressure to bear on corpora-
tions, and that threat "provides a sufficient nexus" between a private
entity's employment decision at the government's behest and the gov-
ernment itself.295
The cases on the constitutional significance of the government's
use of economic coercion applied through a private employer suggest
that it is not the nature of the employment that matters as much as the
source of the pressure. In United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye,296
where an employer administered a polygraph test at the behest of the
government, the Second Circuit held that it "is not the public or pri-
vate status of the person from whom the information is sought but the
fact that the state has involved itself in the use of a substantial eco-
nomic threat to coerce a person into furnishing an incriminating state-
ment. '2 97 The court did not, therefore, "perceive any consequence
flowing from the fact that the threat.., was conveyed through a pri-
291 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
292 457 U.S. 991.
293 Id. at 1004. The Blum Court found, however, that the mere fact that private nursing
homes were subject to state regulations did not convert private physicians' decisions to
transfer patients to a lower level of care into state action, because the decisions "ultimately
turnted] on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards
that are not established by the State." Id. at 1008.
294 Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr,, 192 F.3d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that private telephone company was state actor when it terminated services
of another company at direction of county attorney because county attorney threatened to
bring charges if it refused).
295 Sutton, 192 F.3d at 837 ("[G]overnmental compulsion alone [may] provide[] a suffi-
cient nexus ... to attribute a private entity's conduct to the government."). In Carey v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1987), the Tenth Circuit imposed a
slightly higher standard: "When a constitutional claim is asserted against private parties, to
be classified as state actors under color of law they must be jointly engaged with state
officials in the conduct allegedly violating the federal right." Id. at 1404. Even under that
"joint engagement" approach, however, questioning of employees under an active DPA
would qualify as state action because the government is effectively directing the internal
investigation.
296 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1974).
297 Id. at 415.
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vate employer, admittedly acting as an agent for the police, rather
than through a person on the public payroll." 298
The negative assessment of corporate cooperation that results
from the failure to respond punitively to employees who invoke their
constitutional protections "involves" the government in the corpora-
tion's use of economic threats. The government is responsible,
through the state action doctrine, for unconstitutional conditions
(such as the withdrawal of legal support) that are imposed upon
employees according to the express requirements in a DPA. The
Montanye court further found that public involvement "is no less real
for having been indirect and no less impermissible for having been
concealed. The state is prohibited in either event from compelling a
statement through economically coercive means, whether they are
direct or indirect. ' 299 The government wields indirect power via cor-
porate actors comparable to its direct power to compel incriminating
testimony by threatening the loss of one's position as a police officer,
as in Garrity,3°° the adverse consequences of disbarment, as in
Spevack,30 1 or the loss of a civil service job, as in Uniformed Sanitation
Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation.302
The most significant obstacle to finding state action in this arena
comes from a line of cases involving the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), a private sector regulator of the securities
industry that licenses, governs, and disciplines brokerage firms and
securities representatives. 30 3 Like corporate investigators acting pur-
suant to DPAs, NASD officials perform a quasi-public regulatory
function and routinely pass information on to prosecutors and the
SEC. Nevertheless, their actions are not generally considered govern-
ment conduct because, as the Second Circuit held in Desiderio v.
National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.,3°4 the NASD "is a private
corporation that receives no federal or state funding," and "[i]ts crea-
tion was not mandated by statute, nor does the government appoint
its members or serve on any NASD board or committee. ' 30 5 It was
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
301 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
302 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968).
303 See United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding that
NASD is not state actor). But see Intercontinental Indus. v. Am. Stock Exch., 452 F.2d
935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that stock exchange is state actor).
304 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).
305 Id. at 206; see also Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 134, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (dismissing due process claim because NASD "exercise[s] insufficient state action to
trigger constitutional due process protections").
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dispositive in Desiderio and related cases, however, that the govern-
ment was not aware ex ante that the interviews were being conducted.
A lack of prior knowledge precluded finding the requisite "close
nexus" between the coercive conduct and the state. 306 The NASD
cases turned in large part on the fact that requests for interviews arose
organically within the NASD and were not "generated by govern-
mental persuasion or collusion. ' 30 7 In the case of ongoing compliance
investigations pursuant to the contractual obligations imposed by
DPAs, in contrast, heightened government involvement in internal
investigations does provide that nexus. Internal investigators are the
functional equivalent of informants, who act as de facto agents of the
government when they intend "to elicit incriminating remarks."30 8
In United States v. Antonelli,30 9 the Second Circuit similarly found
no constitutional violation in a security guard's failure to advise a
dockworker of his Miranda rights before questioning because of the
lack of a "de facto connection" between the security guard and "any
public law enforcement agency," and because the guard had not been
influenced or assisted in his questioning of the dockworker by any
government official. 310 Here, however, the government is entwined in
the specific conduct leading to the deprivation of constitutional rights.
According to the Thompson Memorandum factors, "a company's
failure to ensure that its employees disclose whatever they knew,
regardless of their individual rights and concerns, might weigh in favor
306 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(stating that actions of private party constitute state action if there is "such a 'close nexus
between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself'" (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974))); see also D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d
155, 161 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that Fifth Amendment constrains private entity only
insofar as its actions are "fairly attributable" to government); United States v. Shvarts, 90
F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("It is ... beyond cavil that questions put to the
defendants by the NASD in carrying out its own legitimate investigative purposes do not
activate the privilege against self-incrimination.").
307 Cromwell, 279 F.3d at 163; see also United States v. Szur, No. S5 97 CR 108, 1998
WL 132942, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998) (finding no state action where federal investi-
gators did not request searches and were not even aware that they had taken place).
308 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (finding that informant actions that
are deliberately calculated "to elicit incriminating remarks" after right to counsel has
attached constitute state action and therefore violate Sixth Amendment); see also Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991) (holding jailhouse confession was coerced in
violation of Fifth Amendment where paid informant made credible threat of violence while
acting as agent of government).
309 434 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1970).
310 Id. at 336-37 ("It would be a strange doctrine that would so condition the privilege
of a citizen to question another whom he suspects of stealing his property that incrimi-
nating answers would be excluded as evidence in a criminal trial unless the citizen had
warned the marauder that he need not answer.").
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of indicting the company, '' 311 and that threat induces corporations to
compel employee statements.
A closer analogy comes from the Fourth Amendment context,
where evidence received by private individuals will nonetheless be
excluded as though the product of a government search if the private
individual "act[ed] as an agent of the Government or with the partici-
pation or knowledge of any governmental official. '312 A search con-
ducted by an airline employee, for example, was equivalent to a
government search because previous searches had been encouraged
and rewarded by government agencies.313 Likewise, a private railroad
company administering drug tests pursuant to Federal Railroad
Administration requirements was found to be engaged in state action.
The government had expressed not only a strong preference for the
testing but also a desire to "share the fruits of such intrusions. ''3t4
Pursuant to current corporate cooperation doctrine, the government
not only has prior knowledge and a share in the fruits of internal inter-
views, it actually imposes a requirement on corporations, through
DPAs, to conduct those interviews and to sanction employees who
decline to submit. Corporate investigators thus work on behalf of the
government to "find the culprits and turn them in. ''315
311 United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
312 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
313 United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that search con-
stituted state action because government "had knowledge of a particular pattern of search
activity... and had acquiesced in such activity"); see also id. at 792 (citing cases involving
searches by airline employees).
314 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) (holding that Fed-
eral Railroad Administration regulations prescribing blood and urine tests rendered rail-
road's performance of those tests state action).
315 Steve Seidenberg & Tamara Loomis, DOJ Gets Tougher on Corporations: Revised
Guidelines for Bringing a Criminal Case, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24-Mar. 3, 2003, at A13, quoted
in Oesterle, supra note 3, at 477. Another careful distinction drawn for due process pur-
poses lies between the government's use of the SEC's civil investigative authority and the
prosecution of parallel criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d
1083, 1089-90 (D. Or. 2006) (holding that where federal prosecutors had used SEC civil
investigation to mask ongoing criminal investigation, misconduct warranted dismissal of
indictment and suppression of all evidence collected by SEC). Merging civil and criminal
strands of investigation has prompted courts to declare the government's conduct "so
grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice." Id. at 1089
(quoting United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991)). And in the trial of
former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy, his SEC deposition was suppressed because
the court ruled that the civil and criminal investigations improperly merged when the U.S.
Attorney's Office "gave the S.E.C. advice" about the context of the deposition. United
States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ala. 2005). The court's conclusion that
the government had manipulated simultaneous SEC and DOJ investigations for its own
purposes led to the dismissal of three of the perjury counts against Scrushy. Id. at 1135.
Yet, in the context of corporate criminal investigations, the government relies on the state
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Statements received under these circumstances are obtained
through state action. By commanding a particular action, even if that
action is taken entirely by a private party, the government "put[s] its
own weight on the side of the proposed practice" 316 and removes it
from the sphere of "private initiative. ' 317 The line is drawn between
government "acquiescence" (or inaction) 318 and government "com-
mandment, '319 and cooperation requirements under DPAs fall on the
latter side of the line.
D. Strategic State Action
Pressure on employees, via DPAs, stands alone as a constitutional
problem, but it is brought into sharper relief by the government's
treatment of employee statements as obstruction. Recognizing state
action in internal investigations pursuant to DPAs makes sense not
only in light of the case law but also in light of the inconsistencies in
the government's position. The government argues that employers
are "acting alone" when they obtain true and incriminating state-
ments, but it also claims that government agents are functionally in
the room whenever employees make false statements.
Recent prosecutions of minimizing or self-preserving statements
made to nongovernmental parties rest on a novel theory of obstruc-
tion. In a case involving false reporting of market information by
Greg Singleton, a gas trader employed by El Paso Merchant Energy,
the government added obstruction charges arising from statements
that Singleton made solely to an outside law firm retained by his
employer.320 According to the indictment, Singleton "did not dis-
close" to outside counsel, "falsely denied," and "otherwise concealed"
the fact that employees had provided false information to trade publi-
action doctrine to argue that interviews by internal investigators, effectively deputized by
the government and entirely within its control, do not require basic Fifth Amendment
protections.
316 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974); see also Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) ("When the State has commanded a particular result,
it ... has removed that decision from the sphere of private choice.").
317 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
318 See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (finding that ware-
houseman's sale of goods to collect unpaid storage fees, pursuant to New York's Uniform
Commercial Code, did not constitute state action because statute permitted, but did not
require, remedy).
319 See Stone & Perino, supra note 286, at 471 (discussing "distinction between [govern-
ment] acquiescence and commandment").
320 Superseding Indictment at 16-21, United States v. Singleton, Crim. No. H-06-080,
2006 WL 1984467 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2006); see also Harkness & LaVerne, supra note 186
("Recent developments confirm that the U.S. Department of Justice views the obstruction
of justice laws as reaching conduct that many had considered to be without criminal
consequence.").
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of indicting the company, '' 311 and that threat induces corporations to
compel employee statements.
A closer analogy comes from the Fourth Amendment context,
where evidence received by private individuals will nonetheless be
excluded as though the product of a government search if the private
individual "act[ed] as an agent of the Government or with the partici-
pation or knowledge of any governmental official. '312 A search con-
ducted by an airline employee, for example, was equivalent to a
government search because previous searches had been encouraged
and rewarded by government agencies.313 Likewise, a private railroad
company administering drug tests pursuant to Federal Railroad
Administration requirements was found to be engaged in state action.
The government had expressed not only a strong preference for the
testing but also a desire to "share the fruits of such intrusions. ''3t4
Pursuant to current corporate cooperation doctrine, the government
not only has prior knowledge and a share in the fruits of internal inter-
views, it actually imposes a requirement on corporations, through
DPAs, to conduct those interviews and to sanction employees who
decline to submit. Corporate investigators thus work on behalf of the
government to "find the culprits and turn them in. ''315
311 United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
312 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
313 United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that search con-
stituted state action because government "had knowledge of a particular pattern of search
activity... and had acquiesced in such activity"); see also id. at 792 (citing cases involving
searches by airline employees).
314 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) (holding that Fed-
eral Railroad Administration regulations prescribing blood and urine tests rendered rail-
road's performance of those tests state action).
315 Steve Seidenberg & Tamara Loomis, DOJ Gets Tougher on Corporations: Revised
Guidelines for Bringing a Criminal Case, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24-Mar. 3, 2003, at A13, quoted
in Oesterle, supra note 3, at 477. Another careful distinction drawn for due process pur-
poses lies between the government's use of the SEC's civil investigative authority and the
prosecution of parallel criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d
1083, 1089-90 (D. Or. 2006) (holding that where federal prosecutors had used SEC civil
investigation to mask ongoing criminal investigation, misconduct warranted dismissal of
indictment and suppression of all evidence collected by SEC). Merging civil and criminal
strands of investigation has prompted courts to declare the government's conduct "so
grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice." Id. at 1089
(quoting United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991)). And in the trial of
former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy, his SEC deposition was suppressed because
the court ruled that the civil and criminal investigations improperly merged when the U.S.
Attorney's Office "gave the S.E.C. advice" about the context of the deposition. United
States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ala. 2005). The court's conclusion that
the government had manipulated simultaneous SEC and DOJ investigations for its own
purposes led to the dismissal of three of the perjury counts against Scrushy. Id. at 1135.
Yet, in the context of corporate criminal investigations, the government relies on the state
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Stephen Richards, former head of worldwide sales at Computer
Associates, gathered force from the guilty pleas of three other
Computer Associates executives. 32 8 Each of those defendants was
convicted of obstruction of justice for statements made to company
counsel in the course of the internal investigation, and not one of the
indictments included allegations that they directly misled the govern-
ment or the grand jury.329 They were convicted of lying to prosecutors
without ever talking to them.330 Computer Associates General
Counsel Stephen Woghin was also indicted for "proxy obstruction":
statements professing innocence made in a press release and false jus-
tifications made to inside auditors.331
The earlier prosecution of three former executives of the Rite
Aid Corporation likewise illustrates the government's willingness to
charge obstruction on the basis of statements made to internal investi-
gators or material information that is withheld from them. Defen-
dants Martin Grass and Eric Sorkin pled guilty to, among other things,
obstruction of justice, and defendant Franklin Brown was convicted at
trial of conspiracy to obstruct justice, largely as a result of interactions
with internal investigators retained by Rite Aid.332
These prosecutions of false and incomplete statements to corpo-
rate counsel and auditors necessitate the finding of an official, public
dimension to the interactions, that is, of some intent to impede a gov-
ernment investigation or proceeding. 333 The government thus stands
328 Kumar and Richards initially challenged the indictment, but the district court denied
their motion to dismiss the obstruction counts. Memorandum and Order, United States v.
Kumar, CR No. 04-846 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006). In doing so, the court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that statements made to counsel employed by them to represent the com-
pany in connection with the government's ongoing DOJ and SEC investigations had an
"insufficient nexus" with the judicial proceedings. Id. at 8-9.
329 See Information at 8-10, 12-14, United States v. Kaplan, CR No. 04-330 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftflchargingdocs/kaplaninfo.pdf;
Information at 8-10, 13-14, United States v. Rivard, CR No. 04-329 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/rivardinfo.pdf; Information
at 9-13, 16-17, United States v. Zar, CR No. 04-331 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter
Zar Information], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/zarinfo.pdf. For
a brief summary of the indictments, see Berenson, supra note 325.
330 In the case of Computer Associates CFO Ira Zar, the government alleged that he
had armed outside counsel with "false justifications the purpose of which was to counter or
explain away evidence of the 35-day month practice." Zar Information, supra note 329, at
10.
331 Information, supra note 121, at 8-9.
332 See Indictment at 76-80, United States v. Grass, No. 1:02-CR-00146 (M.D. Pa. June
21, 2002), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/grassetalind.pdf (detailing
charges against Grass, Sorkin, and Brown).
333 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2004) (imposing sanction on anyone who
"obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so" (emphasis
added)). The false statement provision also requires that the information concern a matter
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in the shoes of internal investigators for strategic state action purposes
only: It lays claim to the questions if the answers are obstructive but
denies any responsibility if an employee confesses truthfully and
under duress. There is, if anything, a more compelling case for per-
ceiving the government's weight on the scales in the coercive environ-
ment of corporate cooperation than there is for recognizing
obstruction by proxy in cases of organic false statements that may be
morally blameless. 334
The larger questions raised by derivative obstruction offenses
merit further exploration; I have touched on them briefly to highlight
both the significance of the statements that employees may be com-
pelled to make in internal investigations and the incoherence of
declining to apply constitutional protections on state action grounds.
Because this is the current charging paradigm, because the govern-
ment claims to be interchangeable with corporate investigators for
purposes of imposing liability for falsehoods, and because prosecutors
prosecute the false denials, minimizing responses, and "failures to
report" that arise from internal investigations, the government should
also accord the subjects of those investigations constitutional protec-
tions. Extending immunity, moreover, would lead to fewer false state-
ments, and the obstruction that does take place would be a more
considered act of will, and therefore a more justifiable basis for
punishment.
E. The Compliance-Enhancing Function of
Excluding Coerced Statements
Applying Garrity protections in the context of employee state-
ments compelled by an existing DPA would mean excluding those
statements and their fruits in subsequent individual prosecutions.
Such immunity would preclude a shortcut that prosecutors currently
"within the jurisdiction.., of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); see also United
States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining "jurisdiction" in § 1001 as "a
direct relationship [that] obtains between the false statement and an authorized function of
a federal agency or department").
334 See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability
in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1035-56, 1155-61 (1999) (positing
"mandatory culpability" rule of statutory interpretation that would require government to
prove "moral culpability" in cases where criminal statute "might reach conduct that is not
inevitably nefarious" and applying rule to cases concerning prosecutions of false state-
ments (citation omitted)); Stuntz, supra note 260, at 1242-61 (arguing that self-preserving
lies used to avoid more serious consequences are excusable and do not merit punishment).
But see Seidmann & Stein, supra note 222, at 453 n.79 ("[W]e do not see a good reason for
excusing suspects' and defendants' perjury .... [S]uch lies harm not only 'the system,' but
also innocent suspects .... [because they] enable the guilty to pool with the innocent.").
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favor,335 but it would not hinder investigations as much as they fear.
Although granting immunity will, on occasion, mean more investiga-
tive work and less evidence, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
"rejected the notion that citizens may be forced to incriminate them-
selves because it serves a governmental need. '336 Extending Garrity
would neither prevent questioning nor interfere in any personnel deci-
sions, because eliciting truthful and incriminating statements is not in
and of itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment.337 The government
can leverage a DPA to ask questions directly or by proxy through
internal investigators, and corporate employers can terminate
employees deemed uncooperative. The statements that result, how-
ever, should not be introduced in court.
This remedy emerges as well from Kastigar v. United States, 338 in
which the Court settled on use and derivative use immunity as a
"rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege
and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to tes-
tify."' 339 Logistically, an exclusionary rule with the scope of Kastigar
would require modifications to the conduct of investigations, but none
that impose an onerous burden on prosecutors. Mechanisms are in
place in every U.S. Attorney's office to deal with immunized state-
ments through the use of taint teams.340 "Garrity cleaning," for
335 The Thompson Memorandum states, for example, that privilege waivers are favored
because they "permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects,
and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements.
In addition, they are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the completeness
of a corporation's voluntary disclosure and cooperation." Thompson Memorandum, supra
note 15, at 7.
336 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 (1977) ("Government has compelling
interests in maintaining an honest police force and civil service, but this Court did not
permit those interests to justify infringement of Fifth Amendment rights in Garrity,
Gardner, and Uniformed Sanitation, where alternative methods of promoting state aims
were no more apparent than here.").
337 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion)
(explaining that Fifth Amendment privilege does not extend to defendant whose state-
ments were never admitted at trial); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88
(1977) ("[F]ar from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrong-
doers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable."); Sklansky, supra note 160, at 1264
("Where the Fifth Amendment is concerned, the introduction of compelled testimony at
trial is understood to be the violation .....
338 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
339 Id. at 446. But see generally Amar & Lettow, supra note 252, at 858 (advocating
pure rule of testimonial use immunity barring compelled testimony from being introduced
against defendant in criminal trial, but generally admitting fruits of pretrial statements).
340 Taint teams would review reports and redact any employee statements compelled by
threat of termination in order to ensure that subsequent investigative and strategic devel-
opments are not "fruits" of the improperly obtained information. Prosecutors can docu-
ment the preexisting case against individual defendants before taking their statements or
directing internal investigators to do so to preserve the utility of existing evidence. Prose-
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example, is a common practice in civil rights prosecutions involving
police officers according to which a prosecutor otherwise unconnected
to the case reviews reports and statements before the prosecution
team sees them in order to ensure that they do not contain coerced
statements subject to exclusion. Nor will every employee statement
merit exclusion. An employee seeking immunity or a defendant
arguing for exclusion would first have to make the showing of govern-
ment-sponsored coercion and demonstrate both that she subjectively
believed that she had no choice but to speak and that the belief she
held was objectively reasonable. 341
Although fewer prosecutions of low- and mid-level employees
may result from an extension of immunity, the high-level executives
are less likely to experience managerial coercion, and those prosecu-
tions would proceed apace. Immunity could also have the positive
practical impact of expediting investigations and increasing compli-
ance by reducing the cost to employees of providing truthful informa-
tion. Neither the federal use immunity statute nor the Fifth
Amendment precludes the use of a defendant's false statements in
subsequent prosecutions for these offenses, 342 which gives employees
an incentive to tell the truth. Recognizing .this species of immunity
will not, therefore, protect employees who derail investigations with
false statements. In addition, granting immunity does not forfeit the
opportunity to prosecute underlying corporate crimes on the basis of
evidence obtained from other sources. 343
cutors also may resort to the "inevitable discovery" doctrine to clear the logistical hurdle
that immunity raises. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (holding that when "the
evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police
error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is
admissible").
341 United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also United
States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that threat of
economic sanctions against temporary manual laborer was objectively insufficient to
deprive him of free choice to refuse to answer his employer's questions).
342 See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121-32 (1980) (holding that neither
federal immunity statutes nor Fifth Amendment privilege precluded use of defendant's
immunized testimony at subsequent prosecution for making false statements). As the
Apfelbaum Court noted, however:
If the rule is that a witness who is granted immunity may be placed in no worse
a position than if he had been permitted to remain silent, the principle that the
Fifth Amendment does not protect false statements serves merely as a piece of
a legal mosaic justified solely by stare decisis, rather than as part of a doctri-
nally consistent view of that Amendment.
Id. at 128 n.11.
343 Another objection to the application of use and derivative use immunity proceeds as
follows: Private employers would be deciding whether to ask the questions and therefore
would have the power to conclude that information sought is broadly necessary to the
public interest. Obtaining that information might outweigh the need for the in-court evi-
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This form of immunity imports into the "cruel trilemma" the
better alternative to speak truthfully about incriminating matters
without doing immediate damage to oneself. Confronting employees
with the choice to lie, tell all, or forfeit their jobs and benefits forces
them into what game theorists call a "first move dilemma."'344 Recog-
nizing the privilege against self-incrimination under these circum-
stances converts truthful responses into a winning move.345 Intense
pressure to confess, on the other hand, "unacceptably tempts law-
breaking" in the form of "self-protective perjury. ' 346 Immunity
makes truth a significantly more attractive choice than silence (with its
adverse economic consequences) or the fabrication alternative (with
its risk of prosecution for obstruction-type offenses). The application
of immunity thus "sharply reduces the cost of telling the truth," "so
that the one remaining legal option costs no more than the eliminated
silence option. '347 The outcome is more truthful information, at the
cost of some prosecutorial flexibility, but to the potential advantage of
internal compliance generally.348
dence itself, but that conclusion is normally supervised and approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral before it is adopted by government agencies. If private employers are making the
decision, there would be no such supervision, and considerations of the public interest thus
would be delegated, unwisely, to private individuals. Cf Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179
(1954) (affirming Congress's power to pass laws establishing immunity for witnesses testi-
fying in congressional hearings, regardless of whether Attorney General deems witness's
statement worthy of protection). If the application of immunity in a particular case is ques-
tionable, however, prosecutors could raise objections to any motion to exclude employee
statements. The fact that the corporation itself remains vulnerable to prosecution on the
basis of the compelled statements would also deter strategic behavior.
344 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 222, at 444 (describing guilty suspect as held in
"zugzwang, both psychologically and from a purely rational point of view"); id. at 447 ("By
moving first, the suspect inevitably increases his chances of conviction and thus worsens his
position."). Zugzwang is a term for a position in a game such as chess in which a player
confronts two losing moves and the inability to pass. Id. at 447 n.56.
345 The privilege against self-incrimination adds the ability to pass to the equation; it is
"an option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry." WIGMORE, supra note 276, § 2268, at
402 (emphasis added).
346 Stuntz, supra note 260, at 1242-43 (arguing that privilege against self-incrimination
reflects society's "moral preference for truth" by preventing guilty defendants from per-
juring themselves).
347 Id. at 1273. Immunity costs little because it is being applied in situations "that create
a serious temptation to lie and in which excusing lies is systematically affordable." Id. at
1293.
348 In the larger picture, immunity advances prosecutorial objectives as well by
decreasing the number of false statements and thus reducing misinformation that can seri-
ously damage investigations. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 222, at 491 ("By removing
the option to remain silent, the legal system ... encourage[s] defendants to lie."); id. at 499
("[S]uspects who exercise the right to silence would otherwise make false exculpatory
statements."); Stuntz, supra note 260, at 1293 ("[S]ubstitut[ing] silence for perjury [ulti-
mately] should make the process function more smoothly, not less.").
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The traditional defense of the state action doctrine in criminal
procedure-that it preserves private freedom of action 349-does not
apply where the government's commandeering of internal investiga-
tions already has invaded the autonomy of the corporation. Although
courts have rejected similar Fifth Amendment arguments on the
ground that there would be a breakdown in business regulation if
employers did not engage in private enforcement,35 0 current practices
prevent self-regulation because they fail to leave private space for sin-
cere questioning and candid response. 351 Without constitutional pro-
tections, or any means to distinguish between private corporate
counsel and agents of public enforcement authorities, even good-faith
employees, out of sheer self-preservation, will resist proffering
truthful information about potential infractions.
CONCLUSION
The government's "war on corporate crime" shows no signs of
slowing, 352 and prosecutors continue to place a premium on expedi-
ency in individual prosecutions. The government's current approach,
349 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ("One great
object of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as they
choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law."); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action'
requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law
and federal judicial power."); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An
Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94
MICH. L. REv. 302, 335 (1995) ("[S]tate action doctrine preserves a sphere of individual
freedom of action .... "); Sklansky, supra note 160, at 1234 ("The libertarian thrust of [the
Bill of Rights] bolsters the case for limiting their scope to abusive conduct by government
agents.").
350 See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that
interrogation of officer of member firm by New York Stock Exchange did not trigger privi-
lege against self-incrimination). In Solomon, Judge Friendly reasoned that "there would
be a complete breakdown in the regulation of many areas of business if employers did not
carry most of the load of keeping their employees in line and have the sanction of dis-
charge for refusal to answer what is essential to that end." Id. at 870.
351 See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 185, at 156-57 ("In all situations where the com-
pany decides to waive privilege to please the prosecutor, the role of criminal counsel is
repositioned from that of the client's confidential legal advisor and the government's
adversary into a conduit of information between the client and the government.").
352 In fact, the "war"-which had suffered from Arthur Andersen's belated vindication
and several high-profile acquittals and mistrials such as Enron Broadband, Duke Energy,
HealthSouth, Qwest, Quattrone, and Tyco-shows new signs of vitality. Davies &
Scannell, supra note 89 ("The convictions of former Enron Corp. executives Kenneth Lay
and Jeffrey Skilling culminate a crackdown on turn-of-the-century corporate malfeasance.
They also will likely embolden the government to continue its campaign."); see also
Brickey, supra note 8, at 419 ("The showcase trial of Enron's Skilling and Lay will not be
the end of the road. Dozens of executives charged in similar fraud prosecutions are now
awaiting trial, and additional fraud investigations are clearly underway.").
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however, is both questionable policy and the cause of significant
unfairness. Prosecutors should make more up-or-down decisions con-
cerning charges against corporate entities rather than relying on
threats alone and seeking flawed intermediate solutions in DPAs.
Five appropriately targeted entity prosecutions may well have
achieved deterrence goals-while leaving room for self-regulation and
avoiding the unfairness of coerced employee statements-more effec-
tively than the fifty DPAs currently pending.
Even setting aside whether the end of fighting corporate crime
can be achieved via the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda, the
means here violate important Fifth Amendment protections. That
realization has been slow to take hold because the courts, which are
best-suited to safeguard individual rights, rarely have opportunities to
review corporate cooperation cases.353 DPAs involve no judicial
supervision and no independent screen. 354 As a result, "problematic
legal issues may well simmer just below the surface with no resolution,
and the opportunity to test the issues will not arise. ' 35 5 Because
DPAs generally forestall judicial oversight of substantive liability
issues, procedural safeguards for the negotiation and implementation
of DPAs are essential. The individual rights perspective advanced
here provides a route into court, and I advocate it as a way to expose
353 See Stuntz, supra note 116, at 541 ("[A]ppellate judges are much more likely than
legislators or prosecutors to take the interests of defendants into account."); William J.
Stuntz, The Political Economy of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 825-26 (2006)
(arguing for vesting "competitive" discretionary authority over charging and sentencing in
trial judges as check on "concentrated discretion" currently exercised by prosecutors).
Cultural pressures prevent prosecutors from addressing individual rights head on, and
when they do, it is usually with hollow mandates like the McCallum Memorandum, see
supra note 199. Similarly, political forces prevent any real or perceived contraction of
criminal liability through legislative action.
354 DPAs and NPAs filed pretrial do not require judicial approval, but those filed once a
case is pending-such as the individual DPA extended to Frank Quattrone in August
2006-must be submitted to the court. See Memorandum from Michael J. Garcia, U.S.
Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Frank Quattrone, Relating to Deferred Prosecution, No. 03
CR 582 (GBD) (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
QuattroneDeferredProsecutionAgreement.pdf.
355 McLucas et al., supra note 17, at 640; see also Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution,
92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1154-55 (2004) (noting that suppositions underlying pretextual charges
are never examined and that "[dloubts or flaws in the charging decision are all subsumed
in the jury's verdict"); Stuntz, supra note 116, at 571 ("[B]y criminalizing more than it
means to enforce, the system transfers adjudication from courts and juries to prosecu-
tors .... That makes the prosecutor the effective adjudicator of the fraud offense-and if
she adjudicates badly, the legal system will impose no penalty on her."); cf. Barkow, supra
note 164, at 1024-28 (discussing lack of procedural safeguards in federal criminal adjudica-
tion relative to administrative state); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congres-
sional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 762-63 (1999)
(noting that when defendants plead guilty to obtain more lenient sentences, they also give
up chance to challenge underpinnings of their indictments).
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and address the dysfunctions of current DPAs. In the pending KPMG
case, for example, motions to exclude statements compelled by the
corporation in compliance with a DPA afforded some judicial over-
sight of the government's charging strategies. 356 In some recent cases
that have proceeded to trial, juries provide another check on
prosecutorial overreaching. 357
The executive branch self-regulation in the McNulty Memo-
randum does not, however, provide clear remedies or sufficient pro-
tection. As a general matter, resorting to prosecutorial discretion to
curtail executive branch power rings hollow; prosecutors simply have
no incentive to ratchet down investigations or screen out undeserving
defendants when liability for morally blameless conduct is so expan-
sive and the pressure to obtain convictions is so great. 358
356 See United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (suppressing
statements made by some KPMG employees to internal investigators because they were
coerced by KPMG's threats of economic sanctions and because KPMG's coercive tactics
were attributable to federal government); United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding government's use of Thompson Memorandum to force KPMG to
withhold legal assistance from its employees violated employees' Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights). Credit Suisse First Boston investment banker Frank Quattrone also recently
had his criminal conviction reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. United
States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2006).
357 Juries have, for example, rejected the government's arguments in numerous recent
cases. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Jury Finds Ex-Tyco Lawyer Not Guilty of All Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at C1 (describing acquittal of Tyco's General Counsel, Mark
Belnick, of all charges related to his improper receipt of corporate funds); Split Verdict
Reached in Trial of Former Energy Traders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2006, at C4 (recounting
that Dynegy traders were convicted on wire fraud count, but jury acquitted or could not
reach decision on conspiracy and false reporting counts); Stephen Taub, Lawyers Seek
Answers to Symbol Mistrial, CFO.COM, Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/
5570030/c_5569386?f=TodaylnFinanceInside (noting that after six-week trial and four
days of deliberations in Symbol Technologies case, jurors reported they had "exhausted all
options" and judge declared mistrial).
358 The long menu of federal crimes from which prosecutors can choose exacerbates the
problem. Prosecutors can bring obstruction and false statements charges as pretext or
"insurance allegations" either to supplement or to supplant charges of underlying fraudu-
lent conduct. On the broad interpretation of federal criminal law, see Steven D. Clymer,
Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 662-68
(1997), who states that the Court's failure to apply any restrictive interpretation to jurisdic-
tional elements of federal criminal law has created an excess of offenses for federal prose-
cutors to charge, and O'Sullivan, supra note 167, at 666-75, who argues that the federal
criminal code's "overbreadth, vagueness, and redundancy" has allowed judges and prose-
cutors excessive discretion in their interpretation and application of federal criminal law.
On the naYvetd of relying on prosecutorial discretion, see United States v. Wells, 519 U.S.
482, 512 n.15 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting), who observes that "[iut is well settled that
courts will not rely on 'prosecutorial discretion' to ensure that a statute does not ensnare
those beyond its proper confines"; O'Sullivan, supra note 167, at 674, who notes that
"because prosecutorial discretion is largely exercised outside the public eye, it is difficult to
document, let alone to regulate or check"; and Stuntz, supra note 116, at 579-80, who
contends that "[e]nforcement discretion permits overcriminalization, which in turn encour-
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What the proposed extension of immunity will accomplish is ulti-
mately an empirical question, but I theorize that it will have several
positive effects. With respect to individual employees, it may mitigate
unfairness by making it more difficult to convict for marginal miscon-
duct, which could also support underlying law enforcement norms. 359
Immunity may also privilege good-faith employees by making truth
cheaper than the fabrication alternative, and it could improve the
sorting of innocent and guilty defendants by protecting employees
who are blameless at the outset of the investigation but then become
"ensnared by ambiguous circumstances. ' 360 This retail approach to
the Fifth Amendment issue also has the potential to recalibrate the
distinction between public and private enforcement and thereby
address the wholesale problem of the unintended consequences and
unproductive policy impact of DPAs. Although extending immunity
may produce some modest reduction in individual prosecutions, it also
may increase the quality of information and its flow to internal com-
pliance mechanisms.
Deputizing internal investigators, compelling privilege waivers,
and constraining individual defendants' legal resources no doubt
streamlines investigations. But "[i]f the exercise of constitutional
rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
ages more discretion" and that "lt]he result is an unwritten criminal 'law' that consists only
of enforcers' discretionary decisions." For a thoughtful discussion of how prosecutors
should exercise discretion, see David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's
Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 530-31 & nn.108-10 (1999).
359 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 182, at 47 ("Both in justice to those so labeled, and to
preserve the always-threatened moral capital of the criminal law from dilution, conviction
of crime must ordinarily be reserved for those who violate deeply held and broadly agreed
social norms."); Moohr, supra note 103, at 974 (suggesting that "using criminal law as a last
resort, instead of as a primary mechanism, reinforces its legitimacy" and that "[I]egitimacy
is an important factor in encouraging law-abiding behavior because when the system is
viewed as morally credible, even those who have not internalized the social norm are
inclined to obey the law."); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36
J.L. & ECON. 255, 278 (1993) (arguing that expanding range of acts labeled criminal dilutes
its stigmatizing effect); Stuntz, supra note 149, at 1881-86 (arguing that prosecuting mar-
ginal misbehavior in white collar cases has not strengthened public norms against lying or
fraud); id. at 1886 ("[W]hite-collar crime is likely to come to seem increasingly trivial as the
laws forbidding it become increasingly broad.").
360 Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956); see also Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (observing that privilege, "while sometimes a 'shelter to
the guilty,' is often a 'protection to the innocent"' (citing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S.
155, 162 (1955))); William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1903, 1906 (1993) (commenting that "odd pattern of Fifth Amendment protec-
tions" actually "benefit[s] innocent defendants at the expense of the guilty" because it
"facilitate[s] sorting by the government"). But see Dolinko, supra note 259, at 1975-76
("[I]t is difficult to take seriously the notion that the privilege is justified as a safeguard for
the innocent.").
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then there is something very wrong with that system. ' 361 Our adver-
sarial system does not favor bypasses; sometimes prosecutors just
have to do the work themselves or forego criminal charges.
361 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
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